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Language Disenfranchisement in Juries:
A Call for Constitutional Remediation
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose*
Approximately thirteen million U.S. citizens, mostly Latinos and other people of color,
are denied the right to serve on juries due to English language requirements and despite
the possibility (and centuries-old tradition) of juror language accommodation. This
exclusion results in the underrepresentation of racial minorities on juries and has a
detrimental impact on criminal defendants, the perceived legitimacy of the justice system,
and citizen participation in democracy. Yet, it has been virtually ignored. This Article
examines the constitutionality of juror language requirements, focusing primarily on
equal protection and the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. Finding
the existing juridical framework to be wanting, this Article introduces Critical
Originalism—a melding of antisubordination deconstruction principles of Critical Race
Theory with the interpretive methodology of Originalism Theory—as a new method of
ascertaining and capturing the discriminatory intent behind a statute or procedural rule.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I would like to thank the copanelists and participants who provided feedback on this Article: 2012 Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting; 2012 Society of American Law Teachers Annual Meeting; 18th Annual Mid-Atlantic
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference; and LatCrit XVI. I would also like to thank my colleagues
Pat Chew, Andrea Freeman, Jessie Allen, and Ann Tweedy. I am also grateful for the research assistance
of Rachel Morris, Bret Grote, Eryn Correa, Kyle Yeversky, and Megan Block. This Article is dedicated
to the memory of my grandmother Flora Inez Gonzales (1929–2013) whose life inspires my work.
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Introduction
The racial composition of juries has caught the nation’s attention for
decades. African Americans and Latinos continue to be overrepresented
1
as criminal defendants but underrepresented as jurors. This is cause for
serious concern because majority-white juries generally spend less time
deliberating, consider fewer diverse perspectives, commit more errors, and
exhibit more racism than racially diverse juries, which deliberate more
thoroughly, commit fewer errors, diminish the expression of racism, and
2
consider more varied perspectives. Legal scholars have evaluated the ways
in which the law systematically restricts people of color from participating

1. Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section
Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 Hastings L.J. 141, 145 n.16 (2012).
2. See Edie Greene et al.,Wrightsman’s Psychology and the Legal System 305 (6th ed.
2007); Bruce Evan Blaine, Understanding the Psychology of Diversity 101–04 (2d ed. 2013)
(summarizing racial bias in jury deliberations and verdicts when juries are not sufficiently diverse);
Neil Vidmar, The North Carolina Racial Justice Act: An Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness
in Death Penalty Litigation, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1969, 1980 (2012).
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on juries, and felon disenfranchisement has been at the forefront of this
3
scholarly and public discourse. A prior felony conviction can strip a citizen
of her right to serve on a jury, and this exclusion falls disproportionately
on people of color. Similarly, disenfranchisement on the basis of language
4
proficiency excludes roughly the same number of citizens but with two
differences. First, language disenfranchisement creates even greater racial
disproportionality than prior felony status. Second, the exclusion of citizens
from jury service on the basis of English language ability has been virtually
ignored. This presents multiple questions: Why is juror disenfranchisement
on the basis of language not on the political and legal radar screens?
Why are the racial implications of English language juror requirements
overlooked? How can the Constitution be employed to redress juror
language exclusion? This Article seeks to address these queries.
The lack of attentiveness to juror language disenfranchisement as a
political and legal issue is largely due to an assumption that a person
5
must speak English to be able to effectively participate on a jury and the
formalistic separation of language discrimination from race (as well as
ethnicity and national origin) discrimination under the law. The
assumption that English is necessary ignores the possibility of juror
language accommodation. Allowing English language deficient jurors to
serve with the assistance of interpreters has a rich centuries-long history
6
in the Anglo-American and United States legal systems. For example, in
the New Mexico state courts, juror language accommodation programs
7
have been successfully employed for more than a century. In fact, in
New Mexico, the exclusion of limited English proficient (“LEP”) citizens
from jury service on the basis of their language ability violates the state
8
constitution. Juror language accommodation also finds implicit support

3. See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 65 (2003).
4. Statistics about the number of limited English proficient (“LEP”) U.S. citizens are not readily
available. A reasonable estimate of the number of LEP citizens in the United States would be
12.8 million. Approximately forty million people in the United States were foreign born in 2010.
Elizabeth M. Grieco et al., U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey Report: The
Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010 at 1–2 (2012). Of that number, two-fifths (or
17.48 million) are naturalized citizens. Id. at 2. Nearly thirty-nine percent of naturalized citizens are
LEP. Migration Policy Inst., The United States: Language & Education, MPI Data Hub: Migration
Facts, Stats, and Maps, http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state2.cfm?ID=US#1. Thus,
approximately 6.8 million naturalized citizens are LEP. Additionally, 1.9% of natural born citizens are
LEP. Applied to the current population that is approximately six million natural born citizens.
Therefore, in total approximately 12.8 million U.S. citizens are LEP. Similarly, thirteen million citizens
are banned from jury service because they are felons. Kalt, supra note 3, at 67.
5. See Farida Ali, Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing California Standards Twenty Years
After Hernandez v. New York, 8 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 236, 245 n.65 (2013).
6. See Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De
Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 777, 790 (1994).
7. Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. Ct.
Innovation 303, 303 (2008).
8. N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3; State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 330–31 (N.M. 2013).

Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete)

814

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/12/2014 4:19 PM

[Vol. 65:811

in federal courts and state jurisdictions that provide sign language
9
interpreters for deaf and hard of hearing jurors.
There also appears to be a prevalent presumption by the courts that
language discrimination is for the most part separable from race
10
discrimination. Courts and scholars alike generally consider juror
language restrictions to be color-blind and nondiscriminatory measures,
and they ignore the reality that language is closely connected to (and in
11
many instances inseparable from) race, ethnicity, and national origin.
Thus, although the exclusion of individuals from jury service on the basis
12
of their race, ethnicity, or national origin is impermissible, the exclusion
of LEP jurors on the basis of their English language ability is permissible
despite the fact that it often has the same effect of excluding racial
minorities from the jury pool. These racial implications are extensive and
have been under-explored.
In the United States, approximately nine percent of the population is
13
LEP. There is a tremendous relationship between race and limited
English proficiency. Approximately forty-four percent of Latinos and
14
forty percent of Asian Americans are LEP. In total, about eighty-seven
15
percent of LEP people in the United States are people of color. Based
on current population estimates, these percentages translate into an
estimated 25.67 million people of color, approximately 21 million of
whom are Latino. It is not known precisely how many LEP persons are
U.S. citizens and thus eligible to serve on a jury. Under a conservative
estimate, 11.3 million of the 13 million LEP U.S. citizens are people of
16
color, and the vast majority are Latino. What is undeniable, but rarely
discussed, is that the exclusion of LEP persons from the jury box is
overwhelmingly the exclusion of people of color, particularly Latinos.

9. See Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency, 22 ChicanoLatino L. Rev. 37, 50 (2001); see, e.g., United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the presence of a sign-language interpreter did not inhibit jury deliberations or constitute
grounds for a new trial).
10. See Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect
Latinos, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1431 (2004).
11. See id. at 1427. This Article uses the terms “blacks” and “African Americans”
interchangeably except where black is used as an adjective, such as in reference to black Puerto
Ricans. At points, the Article compares the black/African American experience and legal treatment
with that of Latinos. However, it is important to note that the two groups are not clearly separable, as
there is a sizable population of black Latinos in the United States.
12. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
13. Nat’l Ctr. on Immigr. Integration Pol’y, Data Brief: Limited English Proficient
Individuals in the United States: Number, Share, Growth, and Linguistic Diversity 1 (2011).
14. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Table 20: Language Spoken at Home & English-Speaking Ability, by
Age, Race and Ethnicity: 2009 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/
hispanics2009/Table%2020.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See Jorge M. Chavez et al., Sufren Los Niños: Exploring the Impact of Unauthorized
Immigration Status on Children’s Well-Being, 50 Fam. Ct. Rev. 638, 638 (2012).
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Although the widespread requirement that jurors speak English
affects many different racial groups, the burden of language exclusion is
borne predominantly by Spanish-speaking Latinos. This is not surprising
17
because Latinos are both the largest racial minority group and the
18
largest linguistic minority population in the United States. It is also not
surprising because English language restrictions have often arisen in
response to perceived “threats” or “problems” concerning Latino
19
immigration or presence. English language requirements and policies
initially intended to primarily target Latinos and Spanish language
20
users, but the resultant law or rule is stated in race-neutral terms. Under
current constitutional analysis, the discriminatory intent, history, and
context behind a language law, as well as its discriminatory effect, are
generally ignored or disregarded.
This Article examines the constitutionality of juror language
prerequisites, with a focus on their impact on the Latino population. Part I
provides an overview of the differing federal and state juror language
proficiency requirements, as well as background information on the
prevalence of LEP persons in the United States. Part II discusses the
problems that juror language requirements pose. Part III examines juror
English language restrictions under equal protection doctrines of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments and the fair cross section requirement
of the Sixth Amendment. This examination reveals shortcomings in the
current constitutional jurisprudence, particularly equal protection law,
which too often fails to recognize the racially discriminatory intent
behind English language requirements. In response to this failing, this
Article proposes Critical Originalism as a new method for ascertaining the
discriminatory intent of a statute or procedural rule. Part IV proposes
juror language accommodation as a viable solution for remedying the
problems posed by the language requirements.

I. Juror Language Requirements and Limited English
Proficiency in the United States
A. Juror Language Requirements
All federal courts and most state courts currently exclude LEP
persons from jury service. However, despite the pervasiveness of juror
language requirements, the severity of such restrictions varies greatly by

17. See id.
18. Ana Roca & John M. Lipski, Spanish in the United States: Linguistic Contact and
Diversity 2 (1999).
19. See discussion infra Part I.A.2; Philip C. Aka & Lucinda M. Deason, Culturally Competent
Public Services and English-Only Laws, 53 How. L.J. 53, 85 n.207 (2009).
20. See Steven W. Bender, Introduction: Old Hate in New Bottles: Privatizing, Localizing, and
Bundling Anti-Spanish and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the 21st Century, 7 Nev. L.J. 883, 886 (2007).
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jurisdiction. Some courts merely require that potential jurors understand
or speak English, while others require that potential jurors are able to
read and write in English. A survey of the various language prerequisites
is important because the more stringent the language requirement, the
greater the exclusion.
1. The Federal English Language Juror Requirement
The United States does not have an official language. Federal
“Official English” legislation has been proposed repeatedly but has
21
never survived a congressional vote. Nonetheless, English is the
language used in all official proceedings of the federal courts, even in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where the dominant
22
language is Spanish.
The federal government mandated specific language requirements
for jury service in the federal courts with The Jury Selection and Service
23
Act of 1968 (“JSSA”). The JSSA was enacted to provide a uniform jury
selection process to ensure that jury pools are drawn from a “fair cross
section of the community” so that “[n]o citizen shall be excluded from
service as a grand or petit juror . . . on account of race, color, religion,
24
sex, national origin, or economic status.” In terms of a prospective
juror’s language abilities, the JSSA provides that a person is not qualified
for jury service in any federal court if he or she does not speak English or
“is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a
degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror
25
qualification form.” This is a rather stringent standard which would
exclude anyone who speaks English less than very well or who lacks
written literacy in English.
Although the purpose behind the JSSA is to ensure that a jury is
representative of the community, when employed in communities with
high numbers of language minorities, the JSSA’s English language
prerequisite actually prevents significant numbers of racial and national
origin minorities from serving. In our current national demographic,
where Latinos represent the largest and most rapidly growing minority
group, language restrictions such as those in the JSSA can prevent the

21. See English Language Unity Act of 2011, H.R. 997, 112th Cong. (2011) (“To declare English
as the official language of the United States.”); English Language Unity Act of 2009, H.R. 997, 111th
Cong. (2009) (“To declare English as the official language of the United States[.]”); National
Language Act of 2009, H.R. 1229, 111th Cong. (2009) (“[T]o declare English as the official language of
the Government of the United States.”); H.R.J. Res. 19, 110th Cong. (2007).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 963–64 (D.P.R. 1968).
23. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968).
24. Id. § 1862.
25. Id. § 1865(b)(1)–(3).
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jury pool from being derived from a fair cross section of the community.
As discussed below, the majority of states have similar English language
requirements that also result in exclusionary outcomes.
2.

State English Language Juror Requirements

In the state courts, English language juror requirements are derived
from several different sources, including “official English” or “Englishonly” laws, juror language proficiency laws, and local jury rules. Indirect
sources, such as “English-only” or “official English” laws, while not
always binding, set an influential tone in considering who can participate
in governmental functions like jury service. There are twenty-six states
27
that currently have “official English” or “English-only” laws. The bulk
of these laws are statutes, but others came about as amendments to state
28
constitutions. “Official English” laws are decrees declaring English as
29
the official language of the state and government. “English-only” laws

26. See generally Andrea Freeman, Linguistic Colonialism: Law, Independence, and Language
Rights in Puerto Rico, 20 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 179, 190–92 (2010).
27. Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.01; Alaska Stat. § 44.12.300 (2011); Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4;
H.C. Res. 2036, 47th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006); Ark. Code Ann. § 1-4-117 (2011); Cal. Const.
art. III, § 6; Colo. Const. art. II, § 30a; Fla. Const. art. II, § 9; Ga. Code Ann. § 50-3-100 (2011);
Idaho Code Ann. § 73-121 (2012); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 460/20 (2011); Ind. Code. § 1-2-10-1 (2011);
Iowa Code § 1.18 (2012); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 73-2801 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2.013 (West 2011);
Miss. Code. Ann. § 3-3-31 (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.028 (2011); Neb. Const. art. I, § 27; N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 3-C:1 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 145-12 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-02-13 (2011); S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-1-696 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 1-27-20 (2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-404 (2012);
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-1-201 (West 2011); Va. Code Ann. § 1-511 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-6-101
(2011). Additionally Hawai’i provides that English and Hawaiian are the official languages of Hawai’i,
Haw. Const. art. XV, § 4.
28. The English language laws in Alabama, Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.01, California, Cal. Const.
art. III, § 6, Colorado, Colo. Const. art. II, § 30, Florida, Fla. Const. art. II, § 9, and Nebraska, Neb.
Const. art. I, § 27, are all constitutional amendments. Arizona has both a constitutional amendment
and a statute. Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4; H.C. Res. 2036, 47th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006). In
distinguishing constitutional amendments from statutory enactments, Hans Linde notes that
“constitutions [and subsequent amendments] define structures, processes, and restraints of
government, while rules directed at the governed are laws and cannot properly be initiated as
amendments to the constitution.” Hans A. Linde, What Is A Constitution, What Is Not, and Why Does
It Matter?, 87 Or. L. Rev. 717, 727 (2008). Thus, in the context of language rights, “English-Only”
amendments are a mandate on the state legislature to ensure that English remains the official language
of the state. Conversely, the legislature can more easily change statutory provisions.
29. See, e.g., Iowa Code, § 1.18(3) (“In order to encourage every citizen of this state to become
more proficient in the English language, thereby facilitating participation in the economic, political,
and cultural activities of this state and of the United States, the English language is hereby declared to
be the official language of the state of Iowa.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.028 (“The general assembly
recognizes that English is the common language used in Missouri and recognizes that fluency in
English is necessary for full integration into our common American culture for reading readiness.”);
Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-510 (2011) (“(1) English is the official and primary language of: (a) the state
and local governments; (b) government officers and employees acting in the course and scope of their
employment; and (c) government documents and records.”). Nevertheless, scholar Juan Perea argues
that the “anti-Hispanic origins of the official English movement provide ample evidence that, under
present circumstances, proposals for official English legislation in fact represent discrimination against
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often go further than just requiring that English be deemed the “official
language” of the state and additionally require that some or all
governmental activities be conducted in English. For example, Article 28
of the Arizona Constitution has been amended to state that “[o]fficial
30
actions shall be conducted in English.” Nevertheless, despite the
movement toward “English-only” laws, the state and federal
constitutionality of these laws is highly suspect and, in multiple instances,
31
has been successfully challenged.
In addition to questions about their constitutionality, official English
32
laws have been criticized for being nativist, racist, and xenophobic.
Often the popular movements that prompt legislative action are
33
undeniably racist and anti-Latino. These actions are motivated by a
“fear of a Hispanic takeover” and “questions about the intelligence and
values of Latin American immigrants,” and are pursued to further
34
“missions of ‘race betterment.’” Although English-only or official
English laws might not directly prevent the participation of LEP
individuals in jury service, the laws set an unmistakable tone of language
intolerance and demonstrate a desire to exclude language minorities
from full participation in state activities.
Additionally, forty-one states have juror statutes which require that
prospective jurors possess some level of English language proficiency in
35
order to serve on a jury panel. These requirements vary in their

Hispanics, in principal part, framed by proxy and indirection through the closely correlated medium of
language.” Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 360 (1992).
30. Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4.
31. In Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the
Official English Initiative, which adopted English as the state’s official language, was unconstitutional
on First Amendment grounds. 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007). The Court explained “that a wholesale
prohibition on speech in languages other than English by all state and local government employees
creates an untenable risk of preventing employees from speaking freely on matters of public concern.
To the extent that the OEI bars elected officials and public employees from helping citizens secure
available services and participate fully in civic life, it touches upon matters of public concern.” Id. at
204 (footnote ommitted).
32. Perea, supra note 29, at 356–57.
33. See generally Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration and Language Rights: The Evolution of Private
Racist Attitudes into American Public Law and Policy, 7 Nev. L.J. 895 (2007).
34. Aka & Deason, supra note 19, at 85 n.207 (citing Thomas Ricento’s research “based on
examination of the internal documents, funding sources and written statements of leaders of the
English-Only movement”).
35. Ala. Code § 12-16-59 (2011); Alaska Stat. § 09.20.010 (2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21202 (2012); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (2011); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203 (West 2012); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-71-105 (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217 (2011); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4509 (2011); Ga.
Code Ann. § 15-12-163 (2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 612-4 (2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 2-209 (2012);
705 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 305/2 (2011); Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (2013), Ind. St. Jury R. 5 (2011); Iowa
Code § 607A.4 (2012); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 43-158 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.080 (West 2011);
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 401 (2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 1211 (2011); Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. § 8-103 (West 2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 4 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws
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stringency and expectations of English proficiency and language skill sets.
The variance in English language requirements is significant because
English language abilities differ greatly among persons for whom English
is not a first language. The first foreign language skill learned is generally
36
comprehension, followed by speaking ability, reading, and lastly, writing.
Many people who speak English as a second language are unable to read
37
or write in English, or are very limited in their ability. This is not
surprising because a large percentage of English as a second language
38
(“ESL”) learners are fairly uneducated. If the individual is illiterate in her
39
native language, it is not likely that she will become literate in English.
Furthermore, illiteracy remains a problem for a considerable number of
40
native English speakers as well, particularly for persons of color. Thus,
even native English speakers could be excluded in jurisdictions that
predicate jury service on the ability to read and write, a situation that
further limits the number of racial minorities eligible for jury service.
On the most restrictive end of the spectrum of state juror language
prerequisites are those in place in Louisiana, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Vermont, which demand that jurors read, write, speak, and
41
understand English. These statutes arguably go beyond the federal
requirement because they do not limit the required level of language
proficiency to that which is necessary to complete a juror qualification
42
form. Similarly, although the South Dakota juror eligibility statute does
not articulate any requirement to speak English, it requires that jurors be
able to read, write, and understand English without qualification of the
43
proficiency level. Maryland roughly follows the federal requirement—
§ 600.1307a (2012); Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808 (2011); Miss. Code. Ann. § 13-5-1 (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 494.425 (2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1601 (2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 6.010 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 500-A:7-a (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2B:20-1 (West 2011); N.Y. Jud. Law § 510 (McKinney
2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-3 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-09.1-07 (2011); Ohio Crim. R. 24 (2011);
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 658 (2011); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4502 (2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1.1 (2011);
S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-810 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 16-13-10 (2012); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1105 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 962 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.070 (2012); W. Va. Code
§ 52-1-8 (2012); Wis. Stat. § 756.02 (2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101 (2011).
36. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America
32 (2009).
37. Nat’l Ctr. on Immigrant Integration Policy, Migration Policy Inst., Taking Limited
English Proficient Adults into Account in the Federal Adult Education Funding Formula 7
(2009).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. National Assessment of Adult Literacy, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics,
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_dem_race.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). The statistics reveal that in reading
“prose” whites had the highest scores, followed by Asians/Pacific Islanders, blacks, and finally
Hispanics.
41. See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 401 (2011); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4502 (2011); S.D.
Codified Laws § 16-13-10 (2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 962 (2012).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (2013).
43. S.D. Codified Laws § 16-13-10.
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disqualifying individuals for jury service if they cannot speak, read, write,
or comprehend English proficiently enough to satisfactorily complete a
44
juror qualification form.
A dozen states—Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawai’i, Idaho,
Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah, and West
Virginia—require jurors to be able to speak, understand, and read
45
46
English. New Jersey requires that jurors understand and read English.
With less stringency, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Washington require that jurors
speak and understand or communicate in English. Alaska requires that
47
jurors read or speak English. More flexibly, Arizona, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin command
48
that the juror understands English. Less clear are states like California,
Kentucky, Nevada, and Wyoming, which require “sufficient” or
“competent” knowledge of English without indicating precisely which
49
language skill sets would satisfy the requirement. The juror qualification
statutes for the remaining states—Montana, Florida, Tennessee, Texas,
50
and Virginia—are silent on English proficiency. In stark contrast, the
Constitution of New Mexico guarantees the right of any citizen to serve
on a jury irrespective of their native language or inability to speak, read
51
or write English or Spanish.

44. “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and subject to the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act, an individual is not qualified for jury service if the individual: (1) Cannot comprehend
spoken English or speak English; (2) Cannot comprehend written English, read English, or write
English proficiently enough to complete a juror qualification form satisfactorily.” Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. § 8-103 (2011).
45. Ala. Code § 12-16-59 (2011); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-71-105 (2012); Del. Code tit. 10, § 4509
(2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 612-4 (2011); Idaho Code § 209 (2012); Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (2013); Me.
Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 1211 (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 494.425 (2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1601 (2011);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500-A:7-a (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-105 (West 2011); W. Va. Code
§ 52-1-8 (2012).
46. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2B:20-1 (West 2011).
47. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217 (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 1512-163 (2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 4 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.1307a (2012);
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808 (2011); N.Y. Jud. Law § 510 (McKinney 2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.070
(2012).
48. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-202 (2012); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 305/2 (2011); Iowa Code Ann.
§ 607A.4 (2012); Kan. Stat. § 43-158 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-3 (2011); Ohio Crim. R. 24 (2011):
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1.1 (2011); Wis. Stat. § 756.02 (2012).
49. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203 (West 2012); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.080 (2011); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 6.010 (2010); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 658 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101 (2011).
50. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-202 (2012); Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-510 (2011); Fla. Const. art. II, § 9;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-404 (2012); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 62.102 (West 2011); Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-337 (2011).
51. See N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3; see also New Mexico v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 331 (N.M. 2013)
(holding that dismissing a prospective juror for difficulty speaking English was a violation of the New
Mexico Constitution).
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The fact that the vast majority of states have English language
prerequisites for jury service does not indicate the full breadth of the
English language juror requirements in state courts. Even states that do
not officially proclaim an English language requirement might be in the
process of attempting to institute such a requirement, or employ such
requirements in practice. For instance, Texas’s juror qualification statute
states that a person is competent to serve as a juror if that person “is able
to read and write,” but does not specify that the literacy must be in
52
English. In April 2011, the Texas House of Representatives voted to
make a person’s ability to read and write in English a qualification for
53
service as a juror. In the Texas House debate, proponents of the bill
stated that specifying that the requisite literacy be in English did not
change existing practice in the Texas courts that already assumed the
54
ability to read and write would be in English and not another language.
The Texas example demonstrates how juror language requirements can
be stricter in practice than in print, thus excluding more potential jurors
than the statute might suggest on its face.
Juror language requirements that are stricter in practice than the
statute requires are manifest in materials published on court websites or
in printed pamphlet forms for prospective jurors. For instance, the
Indiana state court jury rules provide that in order to serve as a juror, a
potential juror must affirm that she is able to understand, read, and
55
speak English. However, the prospective jurors’ “frequently asked
questions” section of the Indianapolis and Marion County court’s website
assert that in addition to understanding, speaking, and reading English, a
56
person must also be able to write in English to qualify for jury service.
Similarly, the Arkansas statute provides that a prospective juror must
only speak or understand English, while the lay materials on the state
court website include a requirement that a juror be able to read and
57
write English.
In several other jurisdictions, lay materials serve to clarify and
strengthen an ambiguous juror requirement. In California and Wyoming, a
person is competent to serve as a juror if she has “sufficient knowledge” of

52. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 62.102.
53. H.B. 1633, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011) (relating to a person’s ability to read and write English as a
qualification for service as a petit juror).
54. House Transcript Apr. 19, 2011, Tex Tribune (Apr. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.texastribune.org/session/82R/transcripts/2011/4/19/house.
55. Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (2013).
56. Frequently Asked Questions, City of Indianapolis & Marion Cnty., http://www.indy.gov/
eGov/Courts/JuryPool/Pages/faqs.aspx#1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
57. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (2011); Who May be Called to Serve as a Juror?, Ark. Judiciary,
https://courts.arkansas.gov/content/who-may-be-called-serve-juror (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (“You
may be summoned for jury duty if you . . . have the ability to read and write in English.”).
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the English language—an inherently ambiguous and flexible standard.
However, court websites for prospective jurors state that a prospective
59
juror must understand, speak, read, and write English in order to serve.
Irrespective of whether the website materials are the policy of the court,
such representations undoubtedly discourage participation by prospective
jurors who might be qualified under the law to serve, but who might
underestimate their language abilities or be dissuaded from participating
on a jury due to fears of prejudice. Therefore, at a minimum, the websites
might cause prospective jurors who are self-conscious about their limited
English language abilities to question their language skills, be deterred
from following through with jury service, and possibly opt for self60
removal from the jury pool.
In addition to actual juror language requirements, inconsistencies in
courtroom practices and inaccurate lay materials present significant risk
of excluding qualified jurors from the jury pool. Although the right to
serve on a jury is an essential right of citizenship, it appears that these
unauthorized and even unlawful restrictions and deterrents generally go
unnoticed and unchallenged. This is indicative of social and legal cultures
that have become desensitized to, and unmindful of, language
discrimination even where key citizenship rights are breached.
B. Limited English Proficiency in the United States
In the United States, approximately twenty percent of individuals
61
aged five or older speak a language other than English at home. Census
62
data shows that, in 2005 and 2009, approximately 9.4% of the population
63
was LEP. Research also indicates that the percentage of LEP individuals
is actually on the rise—over 29.5 million people in the United States are

58. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203 (West 2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101 (2011).
59. Jury Service Basics, Judicial Council of Cal., http://www.courts.ca.gov/jurybasics.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2014); Jury Duty, Crook Cnty. Wyo., http://www.crookcounty.wy.gov/elected_officials/
clerk_of_district_court/jury_duty.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
60. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Critical Evaluations of Hispanic Participation on the Grand Jury: Key-Man
Selection, Jurymandering, Language, and Representative Quotas, 5 Tex. Hisp. J. L. & Pol’y 7, 8, 34 (2001).
61. Hyon B. Shin & Robert A. Kominski, U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use in the United
States: 2007 at 2 (2010).
62. In 2005, 9.46% of the total population was LEP, and 85.98% of LEP individuals were people of
color. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Table 17: English Ability by Age, Race and Ethnicity: 2005, available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/09/19/a-statistical-portrait-20. In 2009, 9.41% of the total population
was LEP, and eighty-seven percent of LEP individuals were people of color. Pew Hispanic Ctr., supra
note 14.
63. In collecting and analyzing language data, the Census Bureau does not define Limited English
Proficiency. Rather, the individual interviewed is asked to characterize their ability to speak English
as: “very well,” “well,” “not well,” or “not at all.” See Shin & Kominski, supra note 61, at 1. For the
purposes of this paper, limited English proficiency is defined as speaking English less than “very well.”
As jury service requires a high level of language comprehension, it is likely that a person who speaks
English less than very well would be unable to serve without the assistance of an interpreter.
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LEP—making it likely that the percentage of LEP individuals in the
64
population will continue to increase or at a minimum remain constant.
Data shows that there is a significant relationship between English
language ability and race. In 2009, eighty-seven percent of the LEP
65
population was comprised of people of color. As applied to the current
66
population, that is 25.67 million people of color. Furthermore,
approximately forty-four percent of Latinos and forty percent of Asians
67
are LEP. In particular, more than seventy-five percent of Latino
68
immigrants in the United States cannot speak English “very well.” Only
seven percent of Latino immigrants speak English primarily or exclusively
69
at home. Further, the rate of limited English proficiency drops based on
70
educational level. Sixty-two percent of Latino immigrants with college
71
degrees report being able to speak English very well. That percentage
plummets to only thirty-four percent for Latino immigrants with just a
high school education and eleven percent for those who never completed
72
high school. Spanish speakers make up approximately 62.3% of
73
Americans that speak a language other than English at home.
74
LEP Spanish speakers are heavily concentrated in the Southwest,
75
76
77
Texas, California, and Florida. Moreover, in many communities in the
United States, LEP Latinos comprise a large percentage of the population.
In border communities such as San Luis, Arizona, for example, 87.6% of
78
residents speak Spanish at home, and 62% of these individuals speak
79
English less than very well. In Nogales, Arizona, 90.8% of residents

64. Nat’l Ctr. on Immigrant Integration Policy, supra note 37, at 1.
65. Pew Hispanic Ctr., supra note 14.
66. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated the total U.S. population was 315,624,388 in April 2013.
67. Pew Hispanic Ctr., supra note 14.
68. Shirin Hakimzadeh & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., English Usage Among Hispanics
in the United States 1 (2007).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally U.S. Census Bureau, Detailed Tables, in 2006–2008 American Community
Survey (2011) available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/language/data/other/detailed-langtables.xls. In Arizona, 21.69% of the population speaks Spanish. Id. at tbl.5. In New Mexico, 28.31% of
the population speaks Spanish. Id. at tbl.34.
75. Id. at tbl.46 (reporting that 28.98% of the population in Texas speaks Spanish).
76. Id. at tbl.6 (reporting 28.24% of the population in California speaks Spanish).
77. Id. at tbl.11 (reporting 18.81% of the population in Florida speaks Spanish).
78. U.S. Census Bureau, 2005–2009 Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, at B16001 (2009),
available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t (insert
“B16001: Language Spoken at Home by Ability to Speak English for the Population 5-Years and
Over,” then search “San Luis city, Arizona” and “Nogales city, Arizona,” and follow hyperlink
associated with Dataset “2009 ACS 5-year estimates”).
79. Id.
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80

speak Spanish at home and, of that population, 53.7% speak English
81
less than very well. In Hialeah, Florida, 93.6% of residents speak
82
83
Spanish at home, and 65% speak English less than very well.
Furthermore, the 2010 U.S. Census reports that not only are Latinos
the largest minority group, but in the past decade, the rate of growth of
the Latino population has been greater than any other racial or ethnic
84
group; the Latino population increased by forty-three percent,
85
approximately four times the nation’s growth rate. Therefore, assuming
that immigration rates will remain steady, it is likely that the number of
LEP Spanish speakers in the United States will continue to increase,
making the juror language exclusion issue increasingly more important,
particularly for Latinos.

II. The Problems with Juror Language Requirements
As the vast majority of LEP individuals are racial minorities, the
exclusion of persons from jury service on the basis of English language
ability often results in the removal of people of color from the jury pool.
In areas with heavy LEP citizen populations, such as the Spanishspeaking Latino communities mentioned above, language requirements
can produce juries that are not representative of the community. This has
considerable detrimental effects on criminal defendants, potential jurors,
and the perceived legitimacy and actual integrity of our legal system.
A. Criminal Defendants
Criminal defendants, especially racial minority defendants, are the
population most directly affected by juries that are not diverse or
representative of the community. The U.S. criminal justice system has a
long history of disproportionately prosecuting and incarcerating people
86
of color. Thus, the integrity of the criminal justice system is arguably most
important to criminal defendants, whose lives and liberties are in the hands
of criminal juries. Due to the disproportionate prosecution of people of
color, the racial composition of the jury pool is a crucial factor in ensuring
that a defendant receives a fair and just trial. There are many factors that

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (insert “B16001: Language Spoken at Home by Ability to Speak English for the
Population 5-Years and Over,” then search “Hialeah city, Florida,” and follow hyperlink for table).
83. Id.
84. Sharon R. Ennis et al., U.S. Census Bureau, The Hispanic Population: 2010 at 2
(May 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness 16 (2010).
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contribute to racial imbalance in juries, but English language requirements
and their effects on Latino jury service have gone relatively unnoticed.
Like African Americans, Latinos are highly overrepresented in the
87
criminal justice system, but unlike African Americans, criminal justice
statistics regarding Latinos in the criminal justice system are lacking.
Latinos are often lumped together with whites in government statistics,
thereby masking the racial divide in the criminal justice system and
88
prisons. Even so, available statistics indicate a clear overrepresentation
of Latinos in the criminal justice system. For instance, “[i]n 2007, four-inten (40%) offenders sentenced in federal courts were Hispanic, a share
89
larger than whites (27%) or blacks (23%).” “In 2007, Latinos accounted
for 40% of all sentenced federal offenders—more than triple their share
90
(13%) of the total U.S. adult population.” While only 1 in 106 white men
is incarcerated, 1 in every 36 Latino men is incarcerated in the United
91
States. Similarly, Latina women are incarcerated at 1.6 times the rate of
92
white women. For men aged thirty-five years or older, Latinos are
incarcerated at a greater rate than any other racial group, including
93
African Americans.
The overrepresentation of Latinos in the criminal justice system is
even greater in communities with significant populations of LEP Latinos,
making the need for representative jury pools all the more important in
these regions. For instance:
In 2007, more than half (56%) of all Latino offenders were sentenced
in just five of the nation’s 94 U.S. district courts. All five are located
near the U.S.-Mexico border: the Southern (17%) and Western (15%)
districts of Texas, the District of Arizona (11%), the Southern District
94
of California (6%), and the District of New Mexico (6%).

When language requirements bar Latinos from jury service, the justice
system diminishes Latino defendants’ opportunity to have a jury of their
peers.
87. Nancy E. Walker et al., Nat’l Counsel of La Raza, Lost Opportunities: The Reality of
Latinos in the U.S. Criminal Justice System 17 (2004); Christopher Hartney & Linh Vuong, Nat’l
Council on Crime & Delinquency, Created Equal: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the US
Criminal Justice System 2 (2009).
88. See Walker et al., supra note 87, at 16 tbl.2.1 (citing Barry Holman, Nat’l Ctr. on Insts. & Alts.,
Masking the Divide: How Officially Reported Prison Statistics Distort the Racial and Ethnic
Realities of Prison Growth 8 (2001)) (finding over-count of white prisoners at a rate of: 26.7% in
federal prisons, 54.1% in New Mexico, 30.8% in Arizona, 26% in Colorado, and 24.6% in New York).
89. Mark Hugo Lopez & Michael T. Light, Pew Hispanic Ctr., A Rising Share: Hispanics and
Federal Crime i, 1 (2009).
90. Id. at i.
91. Jennifer Warren et al., Pew Ctr. on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008
at 6 (2008).
92. Sentencing Project, Incarcerated Women 2 (2012) (citing Paul Guerino et al., Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2010 (2011)).
93. Walker et al., supra note 87, at 2.
94. Lopez & Light, supra note 89, at i, iv.
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Racially diverse juries are important to ensure fair trials for Latino
criminal defendants for several reasons. Diverse juries reduce racial bias in
deliberations and interject commonsense judgment and understanding
about minority communities, which helps counteract negative stereotyping
about Latino criminality. Research indicates that both overt and
unconscious racial bias can influence jury verdicts in ways that are
damaging to criminal defendants, while the presence of racial diversity
95
on juries reduces the expression of such bias and results in fairer trials.
Even if non-Latino jurors are not particularly biased against Latinos,
non-Latinos often lack the “common sense judgment” and understanding
of the community from which the Latino defendant comes. This is
particularly salient in a trial where the crime took place in a Latino
neighborhood. Americans remain highly segregated by race; people from
96
different racial groups attend separate schools and live in separate
97
communities. “Because of extreme residential segregation, whites are
generally unaware of the realities of daily life in black and Latino
98
neighborhoods.” Latino communities are some of the most insular and
99
racially isolated neighborhoods. Without exposure to Latino life, nonLatino jurors likely have limited ability to understand a Latino
defendant’s community and culture. This lack of familiarity can lead to
harmful results.
For example, imagine that a defendant comes from an urban lowincome Latino neighborhood, and defense counsel asserts as an alibi that
at the time of the crime, the defendant was at a liquor store purchasing
food for his family’s dinner. A juror unfamiliar with defendant’s
neighborhood would likely apply her own experience and that of the
people she knows and perhaps conclude the following: “I don’t buy food

95. See Vidmar, supra note 2, at 1974 (noting how racially mixed juries engage in longer
deliberations, discuss a wider range of information, and are more accurate in their statements about
the case); see also Daniel H. Swett, Cultural Bias in the American Legal System, 4 Law & Soc’y Rev.
79, 97–100 (1969).
96. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The
Case of Deregulated Education, 50 Duke L.J. 753, 788 (2000). As a result of residential housing
segregation, public schools are more segregated today than they ever were before. Id. This is
particularly true for Latinos. Id. Eighty percent of Latino children attend schools that are majority
nonwhite (where fifty to one hundred percent are nonwhite) and forty-three percent attend intensely
segregated schools (where zero to ten percent of the students are white). Gary Orfield et al., Civil
Rights Project, E Pluribus . . . Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students 9
(2012).
97. Beverly Daniel Tatum, Can We Talk About Race?: And Other Conversations in an Era
of School Resegregation 13 (2007) (“Most African Americans, Latinos, and Whites still live in
neighborhoods with people from their same racial group.”).
98. William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction,
100 Ky. L.J. 1, 13 (2011).
99. See Orfield et al., supra note 96, at 9. For instance, in the greater Los Angeles area roughly
thirty percent of Latinos attend a school where whites comprise one percent or less of the student
body. Id.
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at a liquor store and neither does anyone I know. Therefore, defendant
must be lying. If she’s lying, she must be guilty.” Someone familiar with
the defendant’s (or a similar) neighborhood might recognize that it is
located in a “food desert” where liquor stores are one of the few places
100
in the vicinity that carry groceries. A juror with knowledge of the
defendant’s specific community or similar communities could share this
during deliberations and refute an assumption of guilt based solely upon
lying about the food selection at a liquor store. Clearly, there might
nonetheless be sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but at least that finding would not be based on a
misguided assumption about the availability of groceries in defendant’s
neighborhood.
In addition to misgivings about the community that the defendant
comes from, a racial majority juror might not be familiar with the
defendant’s culture or cultural expressions. For instance, imagine that
during trial, photographs of the defendant reveal that he has tattoos of a
cross, the Virgin of Guadalupe, and “Mexicano” or “Chicano” written in
Old English lettering. A juror who has never known anyone with such
tattoos might associate them with gang-style tattoos that one sees in
movies, rather than more accurately assuming that they simply represent
religious devotion, cultural pride, or local style.
To fill in the void of actual knowledge and familiarity, jurors might
instead rely upon media portrayals or prevalent stereotypes about
101
Latinos that are overwhelmingly negative. Despite the fact that Latinos
are now the largest racial minority in the United States, there are still few
positive media examples of Latinos. A 2000 study by the National
Council of La Raza and the National Association of Hispanic Journalists
revealed that only 0.53% of “network television news stories focused on
issues related to Hispanics” and that of “these stories, 80% focused on
just four topics—immigration, affirmative action, crime, and drugs—

100. “Food deserts” are areas that lack grocery stores that sell fresh food and are inundated with
liquor, convenience, and fast food stores. See Christopher J. Curran & Marc-Tizoc González, Food
Justice as Interracial Justice: Urban Farmers, Community Organizations and the Role of Government in
Oakland, California, 43 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 207, 215 (2011). See generally Andrea Freeman,
Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 2221 (2007).
101. See Walker et al., supra note 87, at 2 (“Although rarely covered in the media, when
Hispanics are shown they typically are portrayed as having problems, being criminals, or being a
problem to mainstream White society.”). A study conducted by Pitzer College examined one week of
television network programming in 1992 and found that seventy-five percent of Hispanic characters
were depicted as being in a lower socioeconomic class versus twenty-four percent of blacks and
seventeen percent of whites. Id. “The study’s authors concluded: ‘In general, African Americans are
portrayed positively on prime-time TV. . . . Latinos were more likely described as powerless and
stupid.’” Id. (alteration in original).
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stories in which Latinos were likely to be portrayed in negative roles.”
The rare instances in which Latinos are portrayed in a positive light often
erase their Latino identity. An example is the 2012 Academy Award
winning movie Argo, based on the true story of celebrated Mexican
American Central Intelligence Agency agent Tony Mendez who
facilitated the rescue of diplomats during the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979.
Although the film glorifies Mendez, he is played by a white actor (Ben
Affleck) and the film makes no mention of his Latino heritage aside from
103
Hollywood’s erasure of
one reference to his Spanish surname.
Mendez’s Latino heritage is injurious to Latinos, especially given that the
104
majority of portrayals of Latinos in the media are derogatory.
Moreover, due to perceived foreignness, Latinos are not only
vulnerable to stereotyping about their cultural groups in the United States;
they are also associated with foreign stereotypes. Such stereotyping
contrasts the experience of white Americans, who are generally not
associated with their ancestor culture. The largest population of Latinos
105
in the United States is of Mexican descent, including Chicanos whose
ancestors became U.S. citizens by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe
106
Hidalgo that gave the United States one-third of its current land mass.
Despite this 150-year history of Mexican Americans being U.S. citizens,
Mexican Americans are often treated as foreign even in the states that
107
were once part of Mexico. Thus, in addition to negative stereotyping
about Mexican Americans, this group is also associated with negative
stereotypes about Mexican nationals.
The past few years have marked a tremendous upsurge in the
coverage of violent drug- and gang-related crime in Mexico, which has
led the U.S. Department of State to issue travel warnings for border
towns like Tijuana, Mexico, despite the fact that Tijuana has a lower rate

102. Id. at 4. See generally Federico Subervi et al., Nat’l Assoc. of Hispanic Journalists,
Network Brownout Report 2005: The Portrayal of Latinos & Latino Issues on Network
Television News, 2004 with a Retrospect to 1995 (2005).
103. Moctesuma Esparza, Ben Affleck’s Argo and the White-Washing of the Mexican-American,
BeyondChron (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.beyondchron.org/news/index.php?itemid=10760.
104. See Christina Iturralde, Rhetoric and Violence: Understanding Incidents of Hate Against
Latinos, 12 N.Y. City L. Rev. 417, 420 (2009).
105. Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Characteristics of the 60 Largest
Metropolitan Areas by Hispanic Population 5 (2012) (“Mexican-Americans are by far the nation’s
largest Hispanic origin group, comprising 65% of the total Hispanic population in the United States.”).
106. See Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neoliberal
Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 489, 493 n.18 (2004) (reviewing George Yancey, Who is
White?: Latinos, Asians, and the New Black/Nonblack Divide (2003)) (citing Juan Perea et al.,
Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a Diverse America 248 (2000)).
107. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the MexicanAmerican Experience, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1268 (1997).
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of murder and carjacking than Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mexican
Americans, and often Latinos of all backgrounds, are perceived as
“Mexican,” and considered more criminally inclined than ever due to this
report about crime in Mexico, despite the fact that Latinos are
statistically less likely to be involved in violent crime than any other
109
racial group.
In the absence of actual familiarity with Latinos and positive or
accurate media representation of Latinos, white and other non-Latino
jurors might interpret manners, dress, or other attributes, or just the
phenotype and complexion of a Latino defendant or witness, to be
associated with criminality and a lack of credibility. Looking Latino or
Mexican is too often associated with appearing criminal or dishonest,
because these are the prior dominant visual associations that a majority
juror might possess. Thus, it is particularly important that Latino criminal
defendants have a jury derived from a pool that contains a representative
number of “peers.”
B. Limited English Proficient Citizens
Next to voting, jury service is the most celebrated responsibility of
110
U.S. citizenship. Serving on a jury is a rare opportunity to participate
directly in an institution of democracy and the legal system. As the
Supreme Court noted in J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., participation in
the fair administration of justice “reaffirms the promise of equality under
the law—that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the
111
chance to take part directly in our democracy.” Thus, jury service
provides an important opportunity for minority groups—who might not
have strong support from the legislature or society in general—to directly
112
partake in and influence the justice system.
People who are excluded from jury service are typically those
individuals whom society does not consider to be full citizens: they do
not have formal citizenship status, are not adults, have prior criminal
convictions and have not had their civil rights fully restored, or are
113
deemed to have poor moral character. By including individuals who do
not have sufficient English language proficiency into the group of persons
precluded from jury service, LEP U.S. citizens are essentially made to
share the same status as non-citizens, infants, felons, and persons of

108. Jordan Rane, World’s 10 Most Hated Cities, CNN Travel (June 11, 2012),
http://travel.cnn.com/explorations/life/most-hated-cities-861160.
109. Walker et al., supra note 87, at 4.
110. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
111. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 407).
112. Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of
Difference?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1122–23 (1994).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012).
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immoral character—a tremendous harm to the dignity of LEP individuals.
Such exclusions and juror qualification requirements suggest to LEP
citizens that they are not fit to sit in judgment of legal disputes and
114
criminal justice issues that affect their communities.
Permitting LEP jurors to serve with the assistance of interpreters
instills the value that “sharing in the administration of justice is a phase
115
of civic responsibility.” Allowing LEP jurors to serve in the jury box
would increase democratic participation for significant portions of the
population. Moreover, increased democratic participation vis-à-vis jury
service would strengthen the connection of racial minorities to their
116
respective communities. Data shows that participation in democratic
activities positively influences individual attitudes toward the law and
117
confidence in the legal system. Thus, for Latino individuals who
already experience alienation from the community because of language
ability or societal animus toward immigrants and those perceived to be
immigrants, jury participation presents an opportunity to connect Latinos
to the broader communities in which they reside. Through inclusion in—
rather than exclusion from—democratic activities, Latinos might also gain
a greater sense of pride in the American political and legal systems, and
consequently be more likely to vote and participate in public affairs, as
well as experience increased confidence in the legal system.
C. The Perceived Integrity and Fairness of the Legal System
Racially unrepresentative juries pose risks to the perceived integrity
118
and fairness of the legal system. As such, excluding Latinos on the basis
of language contributes to an undermining of public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system. Because juries serve such an
important function in our justice system, “[r]estricting jury service to only
special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in
the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of a
119
jury trial.” Studies reveal that the overwhelming majority of the public
feels that jury decisions reached by racially diverse juries are fairer than
120
decisions reached by single race juries. This is especially true for
Latinos, who have the highest belief (of any racial group) in the value of
114. Id. Exclusion on the basis of English ability is stigmatizing and reduces LEP citizens to second
class citizenship status. See Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear
of Spanish, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 48 (1992).
115. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurt, J., dissenting).
116. Fukurai, supra note 60, at 12.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 10–11. (“Many believe that an all-White grand jury will be biased against a
Black defendant, or will favor a White defendant who is accused of a crime against a Black victim.”).
119. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
120. Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Kooth, Race in the Jury Box: Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection 128 (2003).
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121

diverse juries. Conversely, nearly fifty percent of Latinos express
122
Therefore, verdicts
distrust toward the criminal justice system.
rendered by representative juries (which include LEP individuals) would
be perceived as more legitimate and would increase public respect for
the criminal justice and court systems, which would in turn preserve “just
123
government power and authority.”
As discussed above, eighty-seven percent of LEP individuals living
in the United States are persons of color. When English language
requirements result in the removal of large segments of populations of
color from the jury pool, jury pools no longer reflect a fair cross section
of the community (as required by the Sixth Amendment), which
effectively denies criminal defendants the opportunity to be tried by a
124
jury of their peers. Further, strict language requirements also preclude
LEP citizens from participating in a primary self-government function,
relegating them to second-class citizenship status in the court system.
Finally, racially unrepresentative juries undermine the perceived
125
legitimacy and authority of the courts. The problems posed by English
language juror requirements implicate fundamental rights and core
citizenship functions that warrant rigorous constitutional examination.

III. The Constitutionality of Juror Language Requirements
Juror language requirements simultaneously infringe upon a
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and LEP citizens’ right to
participate in self-governance vis-à-vis a jury panel. These language
requirements also threaten the perceived fairness and ultimately the
power of the courts and legal system to administer justice effectively. The
exclusion of LEP citizens from jury service on the basis of their English
ability implicates several sources of law: particularly the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its Fifth Amendment
equivalent, and the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment. Analysis of English language juror requirements shows that
civil rights jurisprudence is not prepared to address the unique issues
faced by Latinos who experience discrimination and oppression in
different ways than African Americans, the population that civil rights
laws were originally designed to protect.

121. Id. at 129.
122. Mark Hugo Lopez & Gretchen Livingston, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Hispanics and the
Criminal Justice System: Low Confidence, High Exposure 1 (2009).
123. Fukurai & Kooth, supra note 120, at 133.
124. Hiroshi Fukarai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in Jury Selection,
11 La Raza L.J. 17, 46 (1999).
125. Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror
Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 77 (1993).
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A. Equal Protection
Scholars and the courts generally evaluate language discrimination
claims under laws that have been established to protect racial and ethnic
minorities, such as equal protection and Titles VI and VII of the Civil
126
Rights Act of 1968. This is not surprising due to the close and often
inextricable relationship between language and race or ethnicity and the
lack of explicit protection for minority language status or usage. However,
language discrimination claims can be difficult to establish under equal
protection law because this doctrine was developed without full
contemplation of the diverse manifestations of racial and ethnic
oppression in the United States. Equal protection jurisprudence was
initially developed to address racial discrimination against blacks where
127
language was not a central concern. Although there might be implicit
recognition that language is related to race and ethnicity, or even that
language discrimination can be a manifestation of underlying racial or
ethnic discrimination, it is difficult to succeed on language-based claims
under this jurisprudential rubric. Equal protection law is one of the most
important constraints on government-sponsored racial and ethnic
discrimination, but this doctrine has been slow to recognize languagebased racial and ethnic discrimination.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
in relevant part that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its
128
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is also well established
that there is an implied equal protection component to the Fifth
Amendment that imposes the same obligation on the federal
129
government. Therefore, a LEP citizen who is excluded from jury
service (or more likely a criminal defendant raising a third-party claim on
130
behalf of the excluded citizen or citizens) on the basis of their deficient
English language ability could bring an equal protection claim
challenging an English language juror requirement. However, due to the
limited development and protection of language-based discrimination in
the courts, these claims are difficult to assert and have consistently failed.
For instance, if a LEP Spanish-speaking Latina is excluded from
jury service on the basis of her English language deficiency, she might
challenge this inequality of treatment on a variety of grounds, each of

126. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 161 (2001).
127. See Richard Delgado et al., Authors’ Reply: Creating and Documenting a New Field of Legal
Study, 12 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 103, 105, 107 (2009).
128. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1954).
130. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). (“[A] defendant in a criminal case can raise the
third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded.”).
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which would pose difficulties. One approach would be to challenge a juror
language requirement solely on the basis of language discrimination
without any reference to the excluded citizen’s race, ethnicity, or national
origin. The citizen (or defendant raising a third party claim on her behalf)
could argue that a requirement commanding that a juror read, write,
speak, and understand English in order to serve on a jury classifies,
excludes and discriminates against her on the basis of her language
minority status, and thus violates her equal protection rights. However,
language classifications or requirements, without more, are not subject to
131
any heightened constitutional review. Furthermore, although the right
to serve on a jury is well established and celebrated, it has yet to be
132
recognized as a fundamental right. Thus, without the recognition of
language minorities as a suspect class or the implication of an established
fundamental right, the language requirement that jurors speak English is
subject to rational basis review. Under rational basis review, a court asks
whether the government has a legitimate reason for the language
133
requirement that is rationally linked to it. Here, the government has
plausible reasons for requiring that jurors speak English: because English
is the language of state and federal court proceedings, such requirements
help jurors understand these proceedings and engage in deliberations
without additional expense or concerns about the accuracy of language
interpretation.
Now let us suppose that the same LEP Spanish-speaking citizen
challenges an English language juror requirement on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin. Unlike language classifications, race, ethnicity,
134
and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny. To pass strict scrutiny, a
law must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, be narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest, and be the least restrictive means for
135
achieving that interest. Because juror language accommodation has
been successfully employed as a method of allowing jurors to serve
despite their English language abilities, it is likely that juror language
requirements would fail strict scrutiny because a blanket exclusion of
LEP individuals is not the least restrictive means to ensure that jurors
sufficiently understand proceedings and engage in meaningful
deliberations. However, plaintiff’s obstacles to obtaining such a ruling

131. It should be noted that strong arguments have been advanced for recognizing and protecting
language as a suspect classification distinct from race, ethnicity, and national origin, but this is not the
current state of the law. See Rodríguez, supra note 126.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Rubio v.
Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 602 (Cal. 1979). However, persuasive arguments have been advanced
that jury service is a fundamental right of citizenship. See Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating GenderBased Peremptory Challenges, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1920, 1928 (1992).
133. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
134. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
135. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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are twofold. First, she would have to establish a sufficient link between
language and race, ethnicity, or national origin. Second, the intent
requirement of the equal protection doctrine would need to be satisfied.
1.

The Relationship Between Language and Race, Ethnicity,
National Origin, and the Law

The relationship between language and race, ethnicity, and national
136
origin is recognized in socio-legal scholarship and everyday life.
Nevertheless, the law’s recognition of this connection has been slow to
develop. Statutory law such as Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 has recognized language rights and their connection with race,
ethnicity, and national origin, but interpretations of constitutional law
has not. Consequently, legal treatment of language discrimination and its
connection to race and national origin has been inconsistent. This
Subpart first explores the relationship between language and racial
identity in the context of Latinos in the United States, and then examines
the intersections between language discrimination and race discrimination
under equal protection law.
There are strong connections between race, ethnicity, national
origin, and ancestral languages for many groups, but since Latinos are
the largest minority group, focus on the experience of this population is
timely and appropriate. Race, ethnicity, national origin, and the Spanish
language are inextricably linked for Latinos. The Spanish language is
central to Latino identity, and discrimination on the basis of language has
been a primary method of discriminating against and subordinating
137
Latinos in the United States.
138
Language “defines the essence of cultural identity.” For the
majority of Latinos, Spanish is core to their racial and cultural identity.
Even the Supreme Court has recognized that in localities with substantial
Latino populations, “a significant percentage of the Latino population
speaks fluent Spanish, and that many consider it their preferred
language, the one chosen for personal communication, the one selected
for speaking with the most precision and power, the one used to define
139
the self.” The ties between Spanish and Latino identity extend beyond
the fact that Spanish is a primary language for many Latinos. Even native
English-speaking Latinos often identify culturally through the Spanish
language. Mixing Spanish words with dominant English or the use of

136. See, e.g., Perea, supra note 10, at 1432–34.
137. Id.
138. Rodríguez, supra note 126, at 141; see J.A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in Language,
Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., 1977).
139. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363–64 (1991) (emphasis added).
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varying forms of “Spanglish” are ways to distinguish oneself as Latino/a
140
and create a sense of shared group identity.
Racism against Latinos is often related to the use of the Spanish
141
language, accent, or surname. This is different from the African
American experience, which has focused on discrimination based on
142
color and phenotype. Certainly, Latinos are also subject to identification
and discrimination based upon physical characteristics. In fact, United
States Supreme Court cases and recent laws such as Arizona’s Senate Bill
1070 make “Mexican appearance” acceptable grounds for racial profiling
by police to inquire about the lawfulness of one’s presence on American
143
soil. This is despite the fact that these laws are enforced in geographic
areas with high, if not majority, Mexican-American or Chicano
144
populations, and on land that used to be Mexico. Like blacks, Latinos
are often identified by their “looks” and are consequently subject to
derogatory treatment and racial profiling. Racist cartoons depict Latinos
with certain exaggerated physical features. Derogatory names such as
“spic,” “wetback,” and “beaner” have been employed in similar fashion
145
to the “N word” against blacks.
However, discrimination against Latinos is often manifested
through the Spanish language. The law does not redress much of this
discrimination because it is not based upon physical features or skin color
the way that discrimination often manifests against blacks. Majority white
culture in the United States has historically viewed Spanish speakers as
146
low-class and unintelligent, and Spanish speaking and bilingual Spanish147
English speaking Latino youth have been treated as having no language.
Latino children who speak Spanish at school have been subject to ridicule,
148
Latino
corporal punishment, “Spanish detention” and suspension.
parents have faced allegations of abuse and neglect for speaking Spanish
to their children and have been ordered by courts to cease speaking
Spanish to their children at risk of losing custody or contact with their

140. See Jason Rothman & Amy Beth Rell, A Linguistic Analysis of Spanglish: Relating Language
to Identity, 1 Linguistics & Hum. Sci. 515, 526 (2005).
141. Andrew W. Bribriesco, Note, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes,
Unconscious Bias, Race-Neutral Policies, and Personal Injury, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 373, 378
(2010) (citing Richard Delgado et al., Latinos and the Law: Cases and Materials 3 (2008)).
142. See Richard Delgado et al., Latinos and the Law: Cases and Materials 290–91, 297–98
(2008); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and Brown v.
Board of Education, 47 How. L.J. 473, 489–90 (2004).
143. Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 47, 67 (2010) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975)).
144. Id.
145. See Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 Or. L. Rev. 1257, 1294
n.158 (2011).
146. Bribriesco, supra note 141, at 401.
147. Perea, supra note 10, at 1432.
148. Id. at 1443.
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149

children. People have been fired from their jobs for speaking Spanish
150
at work, even at break time where no customers were present.
Although often cast as an immigrant phenomenon, subordination of
Latinos on the basis of Spanish language is not merely an immigration
issue. Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans whose families have
resided for centuries in what is now the United States have endured a
conquest of their land and culture through laws and policies that compel
151
assimilation. The central component of coerced and sometimes forced
assimilation has been the learning of English and forgoing of Spanish.
This sacrifice comes at a personal cost and is ultimately detrimental to
the nation which could benefit domestically and compete better
internationally with a more multilingual citizenry.
152
As Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights movement of
the 1960s demonstrated, a central manifestation of racism in this country
has been through the segregation of races in education. Like African
Americans, Latinos were subject to educational segregation (assigning
153
students to separate schools based upon race) during the Jim Crow era.
The effects of this segregation were the same as for blacks: a feeling of
inferiority, and limited educational opportunities and career
154
advancement. However, unlike the segregation of blacks, the segregation
of Latinos was largely couched in the pretext of language. In the
Southwest, segregation of Mexican Americans—the country’s largest
Latino population—was justified on the basis of the students’ allegedly
155
deficient language abilities. However, English language ability was not

149. Id. at 1445 (citing Stephen W. Bender, Greasers and Gringos: Latinos, Law, and the
American Imagination 88–94 (2003)).
150. See Perea supra note 10, at 1433.
151. See Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1285 (2006).
152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153. See, e.g., Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (finding the racial
segregation of Latino children in California schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
154. In Mendez v. Westminster School District, the district court found that “the methods of
segregation prevalent in the defendant school districts foster antagonisms in the children and suggest
inferiority among them where none exists.” Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 549
(S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d sub nom. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774. In Brown, the Supreme Court held that
“[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. . . . A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated
school system.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
155. See Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 549; Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930); Robert R. Álvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s First Successful Desegregation
Court
Case,
32 J.
San
Diego
Hist.
no. 2,
1986,
at
116
available
at
http://sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm (citing Petition for Writ of Mandate,
Álvarez v. Lemon Grove Sch. Dist. (1931) (No. 66625)); see also Lupe S. Salinas, Linguaphobia,
Language Rights, and the Right of Privacy, 3 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 53, 63–65 (2007); Guadalupe Salinas,
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determined through an assessment of the pupil’s English language skills.
Rather, the student’s physical appearance or Spanish surname was
enough to determine that the student belonged in the “Mexican” school
156
instead of the school reserved for whites. The law has facilitated this
societal discrimination by failing to recognize the connection between
language and race discrimination and declining to intervene when
language restrictions are a pretext for racial, ethnic, or national origin
discrimination.
The relationship of language to race, ethnicity, and national origin is
157
unsettled in the sphere of constitutional law. The Supreme Court has
not squarely addressed the question of whether language discrimination
amounts to discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national
origin under the Equal Protection Clause. In the few language-based
equal protection cases that have reached the Court, it has often ruled on
alternative statutory or constitutional grounds. For instance, in Lau v.
Nichols, LEP children of Chinese ancestry claimed that the San Francisco
school district’s failure to provide ESL instruction deprived them of equal
educational opportunities under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI
158
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court did not reach the Equal
Protection Clause arguments and relied solely on Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act when it found that the failure to provide Chinese-speaking
students ESL instruction had prevented their access to a meaningful
159
education. Thus, the Court found that the Chinese-speaking minority
group had been denied a federally funded educational benefit on the
160
basis of their national origin or race in violation of Title VI.
Other language discrimination cases before the Supreme Court have
been resolved on the grounds that parents have a fundamental due
161
process right to educate their children in their language of choice. In
Meyer v. Nebraska, for example, the plaintiff was charged with violating
a statute that prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to
162
elementary-aged children. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that
the statute did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment but was a
valid exercise of police power on the grounds that the purpose of the
statute was “that the English language should be and become the mother

Comment, Mexican-Americans and the Desegregation of Schools in the Southwest, 8 Hous. L. Rev. 929,
939 (1971).
156. Mendez v. Westminster: For all the Children/Para Todos los Niños (KOCE 2002).
157. See Josh Hill et al., Watch your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of OfficialEnglish and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 669, 708 (2009).
158. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
159. Id. at 566.
160. Id. at 568.
161. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284
(1927).
162. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
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tongue of all children reared in [the] state.” The plaintiff challenged his
conviction for teaching biblical stories to a parochial school student in
164
German under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the statute on the grounds that
165
parents have the right to have their children taught heritage languages,
and noted that the protection of the Constitution extends “to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
166
tongue.”
Similarly, in Farrington v. Tokushige, the Supreme Court struck
down a statute that severely regulated and effectively prohibited the
teaching of a language other than English or Hawaiian, without a permit,
payment of fees, and demonstration that the permit applicant “is
possessed of the ideals of democracy; knowledge of American history
and institutions, and knows how to read, write and speak the English
language,” and the signing of a pledge that she would “direct the minds
and studies of pupils in such schools as will tend to make them good and
167
loyal American citizens.” The Court struck down the statute on the
ground that it deprived “parents of fair opportunity to procure for their
children instruction which they think important” because the “Japanese
parent has the right to direct the education of his own child without
168
unreasonable restrictions.” Thus, these opinions acknowledged the
different race, ethnicity, or national origin of the language minorities
affected by the language restrictions but focused more on parental rights
169
than language rights.
In the most recent Supreme Court language discrimination case,
Hernandez v. New York, the Court faced the issue of whether Spanish
ability bears such a close relation to ethnicity that exercising a peremptory
challenge on the basis of Spanish-speaking ability violates equal
170
protection, but chose not to address the issue directly. Hernandez dealt
with a criminal trial of a Latino defendant in a heavily Latino and Spanish171
172
speaking area where Spanish language testimony would be presented.
The prosecutor used four peremptory challenges to exclude potential

163. Id. at 398.
164. Id. at 396–97.
165. Id. at 401–02.
166. Id. at 401.
167. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S 284, 293–94 (1927).
168. Id. at 298.
169. See generally Sandra Del Valle, Language Rights and the Law in the United States:
Finding Our Voices (2003).
170. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991) (plurality opinion).
171. Anthony Fassano, Note, The Rashomon Effect, Jury Instructions, and Peremptory Challenges:
Rethinking Hernandez v. New York, 41 Rutgers L.J. 783, 792 (2010).
172. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355–56.
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173

Latino jurors. The prosecutor claimed that he had struck two of the
jurors who were Spanish-English bilingual because he was not certain
174
that they would follow the English translation of evidence. Ultimately,
no Latino served on the jury despite the high population of Latinos and
175
Spanish speakers in the jurisdiction. Hernandez was the first Batson
176
challenge by a Latino brought before the Court.
The analyses of the Hernandez plurality opinion, concurrence, and
dissents focused on whether the prosecutor’s explanation was race-neutral.
The separate opinions reflect different approaches to determining whether
there is a sufficient nexus between race and language that would warrant a
finding of an equal protection violation. Justice O’Connor presented a
highly formalistic approach that severed language from race. In her
concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor stated that
“[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the
explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not implicate
177
the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.”
This approach can be compared with Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion in Hernandez, which recognized that language discrimination can
be sufficiently linked to race or ethnicity so as to implicate the shelter of
178
equal protection. Despite upholding the use of peremptory strikes of
potential jurors who were bilingual and without resolving “the more
difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race should be
179
defined for equal protection purposes,” Justice Kennedy acknowledged
the close relationship between race and language. He noted that an
individual’s language can elicit a response from others that ranges from
“distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. . . . the latter type all too
180
often result[ing] from or initiat[ing] racial hostility.” Justice Kennedy
further stated that “[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in
some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin
color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
181
analysis.” Justice Kennedy acknowledged that there might be a
“locality” where a “significant percentage of the Latino population
speaks fluent Spanish” and in fact prefer communicating in Spanish
182
rather than English. In such a locality, “a prosecutor’s persistence in

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Andrew McGuire, Comment, Peremptory Exclusion of Spanish-Speaking Jurors: Could
Hernandez v. New York Happen Here?, 23 N.M. L. Rev. 467, 467 (1993); Fassano, supra note 171, at 792.
176. McGuire, supra note 175, at 470.
177. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 363–64 (plurality opinion).
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the desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors,” despite any juror
instructions to follow the English translation or to inform the judge if the
translation is incorrect “could be taken into account in determining
183
whether to accept a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.”
In a dissent by Justice Stevens and joined formally by Justice Marshall
and by reference by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens recognized an
184
inherent relationship between race and language. Stevens found that the
prosecutor’s justifications proffered for striking the bilingual jurors were
“insufficient to dispel the existing inference of racial animus” because the
justification “would inevitably result in a disproportionate disqualification
185
of Spanish-speaking venirepersons.” He notes that “[a]n explanation
that is ‘race neutral’ on its face is nonetheless unacceptable if it is merely
186
The dissent appears to
a proxy for a discriminatory practice.”
appreciate the obvious connection between the bilingual jurors’ Spanish
language abilities and Latino background. This approach is in line with
interpretations of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which have recognized language discrimination as a form of national
187
origin discrimination.
2. Intent Requirement
To prevail on a language-based equal protection claim, a plaintiff
must satisfy the intent requirement and prove a connection between the
language discrimination and her race, ethnicity, or nation of origin. In
other words, a plaintiff must show that in enacting the juror language
requirement, the government intended to discriminate against the class
188
of persons to which the plaintiff belongs. This is challenging to prove
under the Court’s narrow view of intent, and such claims have generally
189
not been successful. First, racism has become highly sophisticated.
Even though on-the-ground English-only movements that prompt
190
legislation are often blatantly racist, legislative history is devoid of
explicit expressions of racial intolerance. Even if the intent is to exclude
a group of Latinos (such as a backlash against recent immigration or a
bloom of nativist sentiment), there is no smoking-gun evidence of this in
the legislative record.
The primary reason that courts have not found the intent
requirement to be satisfied is that, on its face, a language requirement

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
See, e.g., State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31 (Or. 2010).
Salinas, supra note 33, at 918.
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applies to all LEP persons, not just speakers of certain languages.
Although a requirement that only targeted Spanish speakers would be
192
found to demonstrate intent to discriminate against Latinos,
discrimination against all people who do not meet certain English language
speaking, reading, or writing skill levels is considered race neutral because
193
it applies to all people with English deficiencies.
Further, even if it can be clearly shown that a language requirement
has a tremendous disparate impact on one group as opposed to society at
large, that disparate impact is still not sufficient under equal protection
doctrine. The Supreme Court has established that the Equal Protection
Clause only renders unconstitutional express racial discrimination and
not those laws that merely have a distinctly disparate effect on a racial
194
group. Thus a facially neutral law, like juror language requirement, is not
violative of equal protection despite the fact that it might have a strikingly
“disproportionate impact” on Latinos or other racial minority groups.
195
Despite significant criticism of this approach, it is not likely that this line
of cases will be overturned soon, which emphasizes the importance of
engaging in a rigorous analytical inquiry into intent that comports with the
true constitutional meaning of equal protection under the law.
3. Critical Originalism
To counter the current myopic view of intentionality, this Article
proposes “Critical Originalism” as a new method of ascertaining the
discriminatory intent of a statute or procedural rule for Equal Protection
purposes. Critical Originalism is the melding of anti-subordination
deconstruction principles of Critical Race Theory with the interpretive
methodology of Originalism Theory. At first glance, the coupling of
tenets of Critical Race Theory and Originalism might seem discordant.
Originalism is predominately touted by political conservatives, while
those who embrace Critical Race Theory are usually politically
196
progressive. However, applying Originalist principles of interpretation

191. See Donna F. Coltharp, Comment, Speaking the Language of Exclusion: How Equal
Protection and Fundamental Rights Analyses Permit Language Discrimination, 28 St. Mary’s L.J. 149,
173 (1996) (citing Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235, 237–39 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
292–93 (1987).
195. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1987).
196. See Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition and Some Problems
for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2011) (citing a study finding that originalism “is
strongly favored by individuals who are conservative in their political orientation”); Critical Race
Theory xi (Kimberle Crenshaw, et al., 1995) (explaining that critical race theory is a
“comprehensive movement in thought and life—created primarily, though not exclusively, by
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under a lens of Critical Race Theory can help reveal the racially
discriminatory intent behind colorblind laws. However, unlike traditional
Originalists, whose starting point is a text’s plain meaning, a criticalist
approach asks us to be concerned about minority subordination, and thus
questions facial neutrality and delves below a law’s epidermis to discern
its true original aim and impetus.
Under a Critical Originalist analysis, the existence of discriminatory
intent behind a statutory requirement is ascertained by examining the
original intent and meaning of the requirement at the point of the
requirement’s initial manifestation, which might well precede the
initiation of the bill that gave rise to the statute. If the origination of the
racially subordinating provision predates passage of the instant statute or
rule and was motivated by discrimination, it should be determined
whether there has been acknowledgement, denunciation, and
remediation of the prior discriminatory intent, or if passage of the law at
issue was a continuance of a previously discriminatory law or policy.
Thus, Critical Race Theory sets the structural critique and scope of
investigation, while Originalism provides the investigatory techniques.
Critical Race Theory is centrally concerned with examining the legal
system as an institution that perpetuates a power structure which
197
privileges the majority and subordinates minorities. Under this view, a
statutory provision that subordinates a racial minority group does not
exist and operate in isolation. Traditional jurisprudence ignores this
structural analysis and examines the discriminatory intent of a statute by
looking narrowly at only the individual statute’s text and possibly
198
legislative history. Under a Critical Originalist approach, rather than
being limited merely to an inquiry into the discriminatory intent of the
particular drafters or enactors of the law or policy at issue, a court could
also look into the legal and political historical origins of the law or policy.
A “new” law might actually be a continuation of similar prior laws or
policies. A Critical Originalist approach does not view the creation of a
law as an insular event that begins with the introduction of a bill and
ends with its enactment, but instead looks back to the origination of the
law. If the current law imposes a requirement that subordinates a racial
group, a court should look back to when the requirement was initially
imposed. At that point of origination, the original intent of the drafters
and the original meaning of the requirement should be examined.

progressive intellectuals of color—[which] compels us to confront critically the most explosive issue in
American civilization: the historical centrality and complicity of law in upholding white supremacy”).
197. Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1007, 1008
(1992).
198. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479–80
(1987).
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In the context of evaluating the discriminatory intent behind juror
language requirements, instead of looking only at the provision’s text
and legislative history for the current juror qualification statute or
procedural rule that contains an English language provision, the court
should also look at the preceding English language requirements that
applied to that jurisdiction, as well as the political backdrop that spawned
the promulgation and continuation of such requirements, to determine
governmental intent to discriminate. This approach is fitting because it
acknowledges the reality that governmental action is broader than the
motivation of individual state actors drafting and enacting a procedural
rule or statute. Government action is institutional action. Prior laws and
policies and their intentions, as well as early and contemporary political
motivations, are part of the institutional ethos. This is particularly true
when the current law or policy at issue is a continuation of previous such
laws or policies without intervening denouncement and remediation of
prior discriminatory aims. From a structural perspective, a discriminatory
intent behind a legal requirement does not eviscerate merely because a
new group of legislators decide to perpetuate the same requirement in a
different statute or rule.
Having set the scope of investigation into a statutory requirement’s
discriminatory intent to the time of its origination and forward, originalist
techniques are useful tools to determine whether such intent exists.
Originalism is a principle of interpretation which maintains that legal text
199
should be interpreted in accordance with its original meaning or intent.
In other words, a legal text should be interpreted to further what the text
meant at the time of its enactment or what the drafter or enactor of the
law intended it to mean or achieve. Originalism initially and chiefly has
been applied to interpretation of constitutions, but it has also been applied
200
to statutes.
Originalism has two central components: a methodological
component (or principle of interpretation mentioned above) and a
political one. The methodology or principal of interpretation attempts to
determine the original intent of the drafters, meaning of the ratifiers, or
201
public meaning at the time of adoption or enactment. The political
component is a value judgment that the original meaning, intent, or
understanding of the drafters/founders should be followed and that it is
not the appropriate role of the judiciary to create, amend, or repeal laws

199. Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 Va. L. Rev. 493,
574–75 (2013).
200. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 5 (1998).
201. Andrew Kent, the New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 Fordham L. Rev.
757, 759 (2013).

Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete)

844

3/12/2014 4:19 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:811
202

in ways that are inconsistent with this intent. Critical Orginalism
embraces the methodological approach while refuting the political
element. Unlike traditional Originalism, Critical Originalism rejects legal
formalism that separates legal reasoning from normative policy and
justice. Further, Critical Originalism does not view the legislature as the
sole purveyor of substantive justice. Rather, it recognizes that in our
legal system the courts have an important role to serve as a check on the
legislature’s actions, to ensure that the legislature does not produce
discriminatory and subordinating laws, and to effectuate equal justice
under the law.
The methodological component of Originalism encompasses two
203
central theories: Original Intent and Original Meaning. Original Intent
Theory provides that in interpreting constitutional or statutory text, one
should look at what the drafter or enactor meant and intended the
204
statute to accomplish. Original Meaning Theory, which is closely
related to textualism, asserts that interpretation of a legal text should be
based on what reasonable persons at the time of its adoption would have
205
understood to be the original meaning. Both of these theories lend
insights into the original discriminatory intent of a statute.
Under a Critical Original Intent Theory analysis, when a legal
requirement or provision produces a subordinating effect, it is necessary
to discern what the original drafters of the requirement or provision
intended to accomplish: Did they intend to discriminate? Were they
aware of the discriminatory effect and did they proceed in reckless
disregard of that effect? If the current law is a continuation of a prior
requirement or policy, did the more recent lawmakers acknowledge the
prior discriminatory intent and effect? Did they repudiate the prior
discriminatory intention? Did the lawmakers take steps to remediate the
discrimination? These are important questions to ask, but can be
challenging to answer. Drafters’ motivations for supporting or passing a
piece of legislation or procedural rule might be diverse, contradictory,
and transient. There might be no records specifying the legislator’s
reasons (purported or actual) for initiating or supporting the enactment
of a law or rule. Moreover, legislators do not work alone. Thus, while it is
challenging to determine the intent of an individual lawmaker, it can be
even more difficult to determine the collective original intent of the

202. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law 23–25 (1997).
203. Williams, supra note 199, at 574.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 575.
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drafters. As such, contemporary Originalists have been critical of the
206
Original Intent branch of Originalism.
Current Originalists’ criticism of Original Intent Theory shows us
insights into reasons why it is, for practical purposes, difficult to ascertain
the discriminatory intent of a law or rule. It is likely unreasonable to
assume that there could be a single unified intent behind a statutory
provision or rule, and even if there were, it would be difficult to determine
207
whether there was a unified intent. Also, as Critical Race Theory
scholarship has demonstrated, racism is increasingly sophisticated, implicit,
208
and covert. It is not likely that a legislator would place race-based
distinctions in the text of the law or overtly state a discriminatory intent
in formal legislative history. Thus, it is fitting to engage in a more
contextualized Original Meaning analysis. Under an Original Meaning
analysis, one must look at the purpose, structure, and history of the law.
A Critical Originalist would ask: What would reasonable people at the
time of passage understand the law to mean? Would they understand the
law to be targeting a certain group for inferior treatment?
Applying a critical originalist analysis to juror language requirements
is an effective method of revealing the racially discriminatory intent
prompting and contemporarily inherent in these restrictions. A striking
example is the English language juror requirement in the federal courts in
209
Puerto Rico, a topic about which I have previously written. As a federal
court, the Jury Selection and Service Act applies and requires that a juror
210
speak, read, write and understand English. This requirement results in
the exclusion of ninety percent of age-eligible Puerto Ricans from federal
211
Further, the language requirement disproportionately
jury service.
212
eliminates Puerto Ricans of African descent from jury service. Although
there is an overrepresentation of black Puerto Ricans appearing as
criminal defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto
213
Rico, very few black Puerto Ricans can be found in the jury box. Under
the current formalistic equal protection intent doctrine, a Puerto Rican
plaintiff bringing an equal protection challenge against the JSSA’s
application in the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico would likely fail.
Under the traditional narrow view of intent, the JSSA would not likely

206. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 983 (2009).
207. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611 (1999).
208. Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil
Rights Law?, 5 Nev. L.J. 213, 216 (2004); Lawrence, supra note 195, at 331, 340–41.
209. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English Speaking Jurors: Remedying a
Century of Denial of the Sixth Amendment in the Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 497 (2011).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (2011).
211. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 498.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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be considered to have a racially discriminatory intent because there is no
evidence that the drafters intended to exclude or make it more difficult
for Latinos generally, or Puerto Ricans more specifically to serve on
juries. There is no indication that the drafters even considered language
minorities, the connection between language and racial minorities, or
214
residents of Puerto Rico when developing and ratifying the English
language provision of the JSSA. Thus, as statutory language and legislative
history appear race neutral, the juror language provision is unassailable
under equal protection doctrine.
A Critical Originalist analysis deconstructs the racial neutrality of
the JSSA’s English requirement as applied to Puerto Rico and reveals a
different story. In determining the original intent of a statute, a Critical
Originalist approach is cognizant of the systemic nature of racism and
how it is institutionalized. Thus, under this approach it is essential to look
beyond the JSSA juror qualification provision to the earliest origins of an
English language requirement in Puerto Rico. In Puerto Rico this
requirement is over a century old, having been first imposed shortly after
215
American conquest. The U.S. government believed that the race, color,
and Spanish language background of Puerto Ricans made them unsuitable
216
for self-governance. Accordingly, Puerto Ricans were denied political
217
sovereignty and voting rights, restrictions that continue today. The vast
majority of Puerto Ricans were also denied the ability to serve on federal
juries. Although virtually none of Puerto Rico’s inhabitants spoke English,
the U.S. government mandated that the sole language of proceedings in
218
federal court would be English.
The English language juror requirement in Puerto Rico has had
three legal manifestations, each seamlessly leading into the next. In 1906,
Congress issued an Act defining the qualification of jurors for service in
219
the U.S. District Court of Puerto Rico. Among other things, this Act
220
required that jurors have sufficient knowledge of the English language.
Next, Congress enacted the Jones Act of 1917, which granted Puerto
Ricans statutory U.S. citizenship (a citizenship status subordinate to

214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2). The JSSA only mentions Puerto Rico in one place that does not
relate to the language requirement.
215. Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1775. See generally Frank
Freidel, The Splendid Little War (1958); David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (1981).
216. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 515.
217. See Igartua v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Gary Lawson &
Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s
Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1123, 1163 (2009).
218. Organic Act (Foraker Act) of 1900, Pub. L. No. 56-191, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (“All
pleadings and proceedings . . . shall be conducted in the English language.”).
219. Act of June 25, 1906, Pub. L. No. 294, ch. 3542, 34 Stat. 466 (1906).
220. Id.
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constitutionally conferred citizenship since it is potentially revocable),
222
and Congress reiterated the English juror language requirement. The
juror language provision of the Jones Act remained in effect until it was
replaced in 1968 by the stricter English language requirement contained
223
in the JSSA.
Having traced the English language juror requirement back to its
origination, the next step of a Critical Originalist analysis is to inquire
into the actual motivation behind the promulgation of English language
prerequisites, the drafters’ intent in imposing these restrictions, and the
original understanding and meaning of the language requirement. Here,
a racially discriminatory intent to discriminate against Puerto Ricans is
apparent. As I have explained elsewhere:
Lawmakers’ beliefs that Puerto Ricans were racially inferior and unfit
for self-governance not only determined colonial rule, but also
determined the specific attributes of that government. This included
the unilateral imposition of English as the language of the federal
court. The English-only mandates in the federal courts simultaneously
ensured Anglo- and Anglophone-American rule in the court and the
exclusion of Puerto Rican participation in (although not subjugation
to) the federal court. At the time of its implementation, Congress could
have chosen to conduct court in Spanish or interpret the English
proceedings into Spanish. If the United States had wanted Puerto
Rican participation, it undoubtedly would have pursued one of these
options. It did not. Thus, one of the original purposes of the English
language requirement was to subordinate Puerto Ricans and wholly
exclude the populations which the government deemed as most
224
undesirable: those of African and mixed race heritage.

Furthermore, reasonable people at the time of the enactment of the
1906 and 1917 juror language requirements would clearly understand that
English-only meant no Spanish. And no Spanish meant the exclusion of
the vast majority of Puerto Ricans from federal jury service. Due to the
lack of English language ability among the masses, only American
expatriates and some of the island’s most elite families would be eligible
for jury service for the foreseeable future.
The final step in a Critical Originalist analysis is to consider whether
there has been any acknowledgement, renunciation, or remediation of

221. See Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 511 (citing Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, Note, A Most
Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial Deference to Unequal Treatment in Light of Puerto Rico’s
Political Process Failure, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 797, 797–98 (2010) (“‘[T]he statutory citizenship status of
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico . . . is not equal, full, permanent, irrevocable citizenship protected by
the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-131, pt. 1, at 19 (1997));
see also Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and
the Law of American Empire, 48 Va. J. Int’l L. 659, 662 (2008)).
222. Organic Act of 1917 (Jones-Shafroth Act), Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, § 44, 39 Stat. 951
(1917) (repealed 1968).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (2011).
224. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 517.
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the prior discriminatory intent. When applied to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico, the JSSA is an unbroken continuation of
the racially discriminatory language requirements instituted in the early
twentieth century. Application of Critical Originalism to the JSSA
English language prerequisite applied in Puerto Rico ferrets out the
discriminatory intent behind that requirement. Inquiry into the historical
purpose of the English language juror requirement reveals that it was
originally racially discriminatory and the intentional racial effects of the
language requirement have changed little over time. The structure of the
law instituted to subordinate Puerto Ricans, especially those of African
descent, remains in place and is effective in carrying out its initial
discriminatory aim. The current language requirement is simply a
continuation of earlier racially motivated inequity. Moreover, the federal
government has not acknowledged, renounced, or remediated this
discrimination. The racially discriminatory intent did not dissipate when
the statutory baton laden with racial animus was passed from the 1917
Jones Act to the 1968 JSSA; rather, that discriminatory intent was passed
on and the law should recognize this. A change of form and statutory
numbering of a requirement should not be sufficient to eviscerate the
original discriminatory intent.
The application of a Critical Originalist inquiry reveals the racially
discriminatory intent behind the application of the JSSA English language
requirement in Puerto Rico. This revelation supports a strict scrutiny
review of a LEP Latino’s equal protection claim challenging the juror
prerequisite. Although the government might have a significant interest in
demanding that jurors speak and understand English, the requirements are
not sufficiently narrowly tailored when juror language accommodation is
an available alternative. As such, it is likely that juror language
requirements would fail strict scrutiny because a complete exclusion of
LEP citizens is not the least restrictive means to ensure that jurors are
competent to serve.
B. Fair Cross Section Requirement of the Sixth Amendment
Unlike equal protection, a fair cross section analysis does not require
225
a showing of intent. Rather, the analysis centers on systematic exclusion.
The Impartiality Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to require that both federal and state juries be selected
226
from a fair cross section of the community. Although this fundamental

225. Chernoff, supra note 1, at 161–62.
226. U.S. Const. amend. VI (providing in relevant part that a defendant has a right to an
“impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”); see, e.g.,
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as
fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”).
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right was not recognized under the Sixth Amendment until 1942, this
legal concept is far from new. The related notion of a “jury of one’s
228
peers” appeared in the Magna Carta in the early thirteenth century. In
thirteenth century England, under the tradition of trial by jury de
229
medietate linguae, mixed juries were provided to foreign defendants.
Mixed juries were composed of half of the defendant’s own countrymen,
and since these individuals spoke defendant’s foreign language, the juries
230
became known as jury de medietate linguae or a “jury of the half tongue.”
These mixed, multilingual juries existed in England for seven centuries and
were also used in the American colonies, later becoming part of the
231
common law tradition of seven states, a practice that spanned 237 years.
Thus, a linguistic and racial/ethnic jury of one’s peers is a longstanding tradition in the United States. However, although modern
common parlance and legal rhetoric often evoke this phrase (“jury of one’s
peers”), in practice, defendants in criminal trials in the United States are
not entitled to juries of their “peers.” Rather, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the guarantee is not that a defendant will have a jury
that looks like him in demographic particulars, but rather that the jury
pool from which his petit or grand jury is selected will be drawn from a
232
fair and representative cross section of the community.
In the beginning, unrepresentative juries were challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These early
cases focused on facially discriminatory statutes which explicitly excluded
entire classes of persons, particularly African Americans, from jury
233
service. As explicit racial statutory exclusions became outmoded, the
courts were faced with claims that facially neutral jury selection laws and
procedures resulted in the statistical underrepresentation of certain

227. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
228. Magna Carta § 39 (1215) (“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we
proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or
by the law of the land.”).
229. Deborah A. Ramirez, A Brief Historical Overview of the Use of the Mixed Jury, 31 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 1213, 1214 (1994).
230. Id.
231. See Ramirez, supra note 6, at 790; Hiroshi Fukari & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and
the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 645, 654–55 (1997) (“At various times between
1674 and 1911, a number of states—including Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New
York, Virginia, and South Carolina—each provided for juries de medietate linguae.”).
232. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (“We have never invoked the fair-crosssection principle to invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective
jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the
community at large.”).
233. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that West Virginia’s
statutory exclusion of African American males from jury service on the basis of color and race violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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racial, gender, and economic groups. Initially, the courts continued to
review these cases under the Fourteenth Amendment.
For instance, in the 1935 case Norris v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court held that a facially race neutral Alabama statute had been
administered in such a way as to exclude African Americans from jury
234
service in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found
that the sweeping assertion by the jury commissioner that he did not
know of any African American in the county that had the character,
fitness, or other statutorily required attributes to serve on a jury was not
sufficient to overcome the evidence that no African American had ever
served on a jury in that jurisdiction despite the presence of qualified
235
African Americans in the county.
Five years later, in Smith v. Texas, the Court reviewed yet another
case involving exclusion of African Americans but this case differed
236
because the exclusion was not absolute. Although African Americans
constituted over twenty percent of the population of Harris County,
Texas, and between three and six thousand such individuals were
statutorily qualified to serve as jurors, only three African Americans had
237
served as grand jurors in a seven year period. The Court found that
“[c]hance and accident alone could hardly have brought about the listing
for grand jury service so few negroes from among the thousands”
238
qualified. Here, the state statutory scheme was not discriminatory on
its face, but “by reason of the wide discretion permissible in the various
steps of the plan,” it was capable of being applied in a discriminatory
239
manner. The Court emphasized that:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from
jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic
240
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.

234. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590–91 (1935) (“The jury commission shall place on the jury
roll and in the jury box the names of all male citizens of the county who are generally reputed to be
honest and intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and
sound judgment, but no person must be selected who is under twenty-one or over sixty-five years of
age, or, who is an habitual drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a permanent disease or physical
weakness is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror or who cannot read English, or who has ever been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. If a person cannot read English and has all the
other qualifications prescribed herein and is a freeholder or householder, his name may be placed on
the jury roll and in the jury box.” (citing Ala. Code § 8603 (1923)).
235. Id. at 599.
236. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
237. Id. at 129.
238. Id. at 131.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
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Although decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of
the jury needing to be a “body truly representative” is a direct precursor to
modern day Sixth Amendment fair cross section jurisprudence.
Furthermore, rather than focusing on racial animus or discriminatory
intent, the Court looked to statistical evidence to determine that African
241
Americans had been systemically excluded from jury service.
Two years later, in the 1942 case Glasser v. United States, the Court
reiterated its formulation of representative juries, but this time within the
242
In
framework of the Sixth Amendment’s Impartiality Clause.
addressing a claim of exclusion of all women who were not members of
the Illinois League of Women Voters from the jury pool, the Court
stated that officials charged with selecting jurors “must not allow the
desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not
comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the
243
community.” Thus, systemic jury pool exclusion cases (as opposed to
individual juror exclusion) came under the purview of the Sixth
Amendment and the fair cross section requirement was born. In 1975,
the Supreme Court declared that the fair cross section requirement is a
244
fundamental right. This fundamental right can be raised by criminal
defendants irrespective of whether they are a member of the group
245
allegedly excluded.
In the 1979 case Duren v. Missouri, the Court articulated the
contemporary test to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross
246
section requirement. This case confronted a Missouri statute that
247
allowed women to request an automatic exemption from jury service.
Ultimately, the Court found that the statute resulted in an underrepresentation of women in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair
248
cross section guarantee. In making this determination the Court put
forth the test for establishing a prima facie violation:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is
a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of
this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

241. Id. at 129.
242. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (stating that “the proper functioning of the
jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a ‘body truly representative of
the community.’”).
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
245. Id. at 526 (holding that a male defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of women
from the jury pool); see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality) (finding that a white male could
challenge the exclusion of African Americans from jury service).
246. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
247. Id. at 360.
248. Id.
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and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion
249
of the group in the jury-selection process.

However, even if a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of a fair cross
section violation, the government can overcome this demonstration if
“those aspects of the jury-selection process,” which result “in the
disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group,” advance a significant
250
state interest.
Each prong of the Duren test, when applied to the juror language
requirements (particularly with respect to the Latino community),
exposes several problems as to the legitimacy of language exclusions.
The first inquiry, whether the excluded group is “distinct,” raises the
issue of how narrowly to define the group. The group could be
articulated as LEP persons, a specific LEP racial group, or the racial
group generally. For the purposes of this analysis, this Article defines the
cognizable group as Latinos. Once the group is defined, the analysis
turns to whether the representation of this group in the jury pool is “fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
251
community.” Finally, under the third prong of Duren, the test asks if
this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of the English
252
language requirement itself or to other factors.
In asserting a fair cross section claim, a Plaintiff must show that “the
253
group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community.”
The Supreme Court has not defined the requirements for establishing a
254
“distinctive” group. Nevertheless, in Lockhart v. McCree, the Court
provided some limited guidance for groups that fall within the purview of
255
a fair cross section claim. The Court reflected on the groups that have
traditionally been recognized under fair cross section doctrine—namely
256
African Americans, women, and Mexican Americans —and noted that
the recognized common factor between these groups has been the
257
immutable nature of a group’s characteristics. The Court reasoned that
the exclusion of jurors based on some immutable characteristic, such as
racial, ethnic, or gender background, is not acceptable because it gives
258
rise to an impermissible “appearance of unfairness.” In Lockhart, the

249. Id. at 364.
250. Id. at 367–68.
251. Id. at 364.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (“We have never attempted to precisely define
the term ‘distinctive group,’ and we do not undertake to do so today.”).
255. See id.
256. Id. at 175.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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Court also expressed concern about exclusions denying members of
259
historically disadvantaged groups the right to serve on a jury.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has provided little guidance in
defining a “distinctive” group, federal and state lower courts have
developed their own tests. Many courts have developed some iteration of
the following test:
(1) [T]he group must be defined and limited by some clearly
identifiable factor (such as race or sex), (2) there must be a common
thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas or experience which runs
through members of the group, and (3) there must be a community of
interest among the members of the group to the extent that the group’s
interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded
260
from the jury selection process.

Latinos “are unquestionably [a] ‘distinctive’ group[] for the
261
purposes of a fair-cross-section analysis.” In Lockhart v. McCree, the
Court stressed that “it [is] obvious that the concept of ‘distinctiveness’
262
must be linked to the purposes of the fair-cross-section requirement.”
These purposes include: “guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary
263
power;” “ensuring that the ‘commonsense judgment of the community’
264
will act as ‘a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor;’”
“preserving ‘public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
265
and “implementing our belief that ‘sharing in the
system;’”
266
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’” These first
two fair cross section purposes are closely connected. Many communities
that have a high Latino population are also high-crime areas. Latinos and
Spanish speakers are overrepresented as criminal defendants, witnesses,
267
and crime victims. Many crimes for which Latino defendants have been
268
When juror language
charged occur in Latino neighborhoods.
restrictions are imposed in communities with a significant population of
Latinos, the jury pool will likely not be representative of the community.
This will deprive the jury of “jurors who share the same culture and
language with witnesses and may have a better understanding of
259. Id.
260. See Vermont v. Pelican, 580 A.2d 942, 947 (Vt. 1990); see also Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677,
681–82 (6th Cir. 1988); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212,
1216 (11th Cir. 1983); Washington v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210, 218 (Wash. 1987).
261. See United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Jackman,
46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d Cir. 1995)); United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2005); see
also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478–80 (1954).
262. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986).
263. Id. at 174 (alteration in original).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 174–75.
266. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
267. See Fukurai, supra note 60, at 11.
268. Ronald Weich & Carlos Angulo, Citizens’ Comm’n on Civil Rights, Racial Disparities in
the American Criminal Justice System 205 (2000).
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testimony” and evidence. Including LEP Latinos in juries would likely
decrease miscommunication, as well as actual and perceived racial and
cultural bias.
When a jury is racially or culturally homogenous, it is more difficult
or less likely that the jurors will consider a wide range of perspectives
270
during the fact-finding process. It is essential that during the factfinding process (whether during trial or deliberations), jurors understand
271
all of the circumstances surrounding a particular event. After all, the
justice system entrusts jurors with the important duty of finding “truth”
in a particular case, and “truth” is not found by assessments based on
272
homogenous points of view. Therefore, in the context of a trial with a
Latino defendant and an LEP Spanish-speaking juror, that juror could
provide significant insights to other members of the jury. For example,
the juror might be able to explain certain Spanish slang words or
colloquialisms not easily translatable into English; the juror might also be
able to expound upon cultural practices or norms unique to the local
Latino culture.
The New Mexico jury system, which dates back to the Treaty of
273
Guadalupe Hidalgo, provides interpreters for LEP jurors. It is especially
appropriate to have such a system in New Mexico given that 35.84% of the
population of New Mexico speaks a language other than English at
274
home. While the system poses some logistical problems for the courts—
mostly in finding enough interpreters—the inclusion of LEP jurors has
275
been lauded as providing the fairest jury of defendant’s peers. In a state
where more than one-third of the population is non-English speaking,
the inclusion of non-English speaking jurors undoubtedly expands the
cultural perspective and understandings of the jury pool, making trials
more fair for defendants. The expansion of racial minority roles in the
jury is particularly important because minority groups are typically

269. Fukurai, supra note 60, at 34.
270. See id. at 12.
271. See id. at 13.
272. In fact, Douglas Smith notes that the “evolution of modern American jury practices has had
an adverse impact on the jury’s ability to discover the truth and to arrive at just outcomes.” Douglas
G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for
Reform, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441, 451 (1997).
273. Scott Sandlin, Courts Rise to Language Challenge, Albuquerque J., Nov. 15, 2004, at A1.
274. U.S. Census Bureau, Detailed Tables, supra note 74, at tbl.34. In particular, in New
Mexico, 28.31% of the population speaks Spanish. Id.
275. Associated Press, In New Mexico County, Jurors Need Not Speak English, Wash. Post,
Dec. 16, 1999, at G09 (“Similarly, Larry Dodge, founder of the Fully Informed Jury Association, a
nonprofit group in Helmville, Mont., that educates Americans about their rights as jurors, said he is
not aware of any other state with such a provision. He welcomed the ruling. ‘If you’re talking about a
jury of your peers, this is it,’ Dodge said. ‘We think a random cross-section of the community is the
right way to run a jury trial.’”).
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276

overrepresented as criminal defendants.
Furthermore, the juror
interpreter system has become so widespread that a court interpreter
noted “we’ve had trials where we’ve had eight non-English speakers (in
the pool) and out of that, four were impaneled as jurors”—an indication
that New Mexico trials include and embody the true idea of a “fair cross
277
section” of the community.
While it is clear that Latinos present a “distinctive group” for prong
one of the Duren analysis (and it is also possible that LEP Latinos might
also constitute a “distinctive group”), the more complicated issue is
whether the representation of this group in the jury pool is “fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
278
community.” To answer prong two of the Duren test, courts must
establish which individuals should count within the community. For
instance, should Latinos who are ineligible for jury service on the basis of
citizenship status or former felon status be included in determining how
many Latinos exist in the community? Or should the community only
consist of those people who are statutorily eligible for jury service?
Further, once the number of Latinos in the community and the number
of Latinos in the jury pool are established, what level of systematic
279
exclusion is sufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation? The
federal circuits have split on the proper formula for determining an
280
impermissible level of underrepresentation.

276. Am. Soc. Ass’n, Dep’t of Research & Dev., Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice
System 2–3 (2007).
277. Sandlin, supra note 273.
278. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
279. See Stephen E. Reil, Comment, Who Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for
Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. Rev.
201 (2007); Richard M. Ré, Comment, Jury Poker: A Statistical Analysis of the Fair Cross-Section
Requirement, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 533 (2011); Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational
Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair Cross-section of the Community”, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155,
194–95 (1995).
280. This is evident from a comparison of the federal circuits and states which have the largest
populations of Latinos. The First Circuit uses the absolute disparity test and jury eligible populations
where available, but they do not expressly state a preference. The available cases reject fairly low
absolute disparities (under five percent). See, e.g., United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
The Second Circuit expresses a preference for jury eligible population figures, but recognizes that such
figures are not generally readily available. Instead they use voting age population figures and an
absolute numbers test to calculate disparities. This involves finding the absolute disparity and then
calculating how many people from an underrepresented group would have to be added to the jury
venire to remedy the underrepresentation. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1990). The Fifth Circuit uses absolute disparity. The circuit has rejected the use of total population
figures as irrelevant. See United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit favors
absolute disparity and will use total population figures where age eligible or jury eligible figures are
not available. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit
uses both absolute and comparative disparity in determining whether underrepresentation exists. See
United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit prefers age eligible
population figures when available. See United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998). The
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Finally, the third factor in a Duren analysis is whether the
“underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
281
jury-selection process.” The fact that exclusion of LEP jurors is a
statutory and sometimes state constitutional mandate makes the third
prong of the Duren test fairly easy to prove for the LEP juror group.
Unlike many cases where underrepresentation of certain groups is the
result of some “coincidence” in selection of the jury venire, in the case of
juror language requirements the exclusion is the result of explicit
governmental action. Here, therefore, underrepresentation of Latinos is
due directly to statutory English language requirements and failure to
provide juror language accommodation. The rationale for the exclusion
of LEP jurors is that limited English ability, without the assistance of an
interpreter, could pose a serious problem in a courtroom setting.
Nevertheless, as the New Mexico example amply demonstrates, this
seeming difficulty can be remedied.
In Duren, the Court stated that the government could prevail despite
demonstration of a fair cross section violation if the aspects of the juryselection process that resulted in the disproportionate exclusion advanced
282
a significant state interest. The majority of fair cross section challenges to
the English language juror requirements have come out of Puerto Rico,
where ninety percent of the age-eligible population is excluded from jury
283
service under the JSSA prerequisite. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit (which hears appeals from the U.S. District Court for Puerto
Rico) has repeatedly held that, even assuming a fair cross section prima
facie case had been made, such a claim would be overcome by the
government’s interest that federal court proceedings be conducted in
284
English. The First Circuit also upheld the government justifications for
excluding LEP citizens from the jury pool, irrespective of the possibility
285
of juror interpreters. The government might have a legitimate interest
in conducting court proceedings in the English language; however,

Eleventh Circuit uses absolute disparity but notes that it might not be as useful where the minority
population in controversy is small and uses jury eligible population figures. See United States v. Pepe,
747 F.2d 632 (11th Cir. 1984). Arizona favors an absolute disparity test. See, e.g., State v. Gretzler,
612 P.2d 1023 (Ariz. 1980); Arizona v. Sanderson, 898 P.2d 483 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). California uses
both the absolute and comparative disparity tests and prefers juror-qualified population data. People
v. Currie, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Nevada uses both total population and age
eligible population figures and absolute and comparative disparity figures. See, e.g., Evans v. State,
926 P.2d 265 (Nev. 1996); Williams v. State, 125 P.3d 627 (Nev. 2005). New York uses both absolute
and comparative disparities and allows the use of general population figures. See, e.g., People v.
Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Texas uses total population figures and absolute
disparity test. See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 678 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
281. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
282. Id. at 367–68.
283. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 498.
284. United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1981).
285. United States v. Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002).
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allowing jurors to serve with the assistance of interpreters does not
frustrate this interest. Permitting juror language accommodation actually
strengthens the government’s interests in providing fair and impartial
juries, as emphasized in the New Mexico jury service model.
Since the right to a jury represented by a fair cross section of a
286
defendant’s peers is a “fundamental right,” jurisdictions should be
particularly sensitive to protecting the right, even in the face of state
interests. Unlike felon prohibitions on jury service, where a state
excludes potential jurors with perceived low moral values or who show
disrespect for the law, or juror age requirements, which ensure a certain
comprehension level and an understanding of the gravity of jury service,
the particular problem that states seek to solve through juror language
exclusions is remediable. It would be more difficult for a state to evaluate
a felon juror’s respect for the justice system, or a twelve-year-old child’s
understanding of legal proceedings; however, as New Mexico has
demonstrated, it is quite possible to provide interpreters to LEP jurors.
Thus, in the interest of protecting a defendant’s fundamental right to a
fair trial and impartial jury, courts should reconsider the legitimacy of
juror exclusions based on language ability and the state’s interest in an
English-speaking jury panel.

IV. Juror Language Accommodation
Modern courts and legislatures widely perceive English language
deficiency as a valid reason to exclude potential jurors, under the
assumption that a juror cannot serve effectively if she cannot understand
the trial. But this language deficiency could be remedied by the use of
interpreters. Although opponents of juror language accommodation
might claim that allowing an interpreter to assist a LEP juror goes
287
against our legal tradition, juror interpretation has a rich history in the
288
development of the common law. The practice of mixed linguistic juries
spanned seven centuries in England and has existed on what is now U.S.
289
soil for more than two centuries. After the United States obtained onethird of its current land mass from Mexico through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 and the Sale of La Mesilla in 1853,
monolingual Spanish speakers often served on juries with the assistance
290
of interpreters until the early 20th century.

286. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
287. See, e.g., Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 20; Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d at 17.
288. Ramirez, supra note 229, at 1214; Ramirez, supra note 6, at 790.
289. Id.
290. Laura E. Gómez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law: Mexicans and the American Criminal
Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1129, 1166, 1172–73 (2000); Douglas A.
Kibbee, Minority Language Rights: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 3 Intercultural Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 79, 90 (2008); Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency,

Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete)

858

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/12/2014 4:19 PM

[Vol. 65:811

Ever since New Mexico became a United States territory, it “has
encouraged participation of non-English speakers, particularly Spanish291
speaking citizens, in its jury system.” Initially, this practice emerged out
of necessity, since New Mexico was a predominately Spanish-speaking
area and an adequate supply of English-speaking jurors was not readily
292
available. But this practice was not only practical, but also motivated
by a sense of respect: the practice gave the Spanish-speaking citizens of
New Mexico an important societal duty and, in return, Spanish-speaking
citizens valued the opportunity to ensure their equal participation in civic
293
society. The common law practice of allowing non-English speakers to
294
serve on juries was made a constitutional right in 1911. Article VII of
the Constitution of New Mexico states that the “right of any citizen of
the state to vote, hold office or sit upon juries, shall never be restricted,
abridged or impaired on account of religion, race, language or color, or
295
inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages.”
New Mexico state courts have successfully allowed non-English speakers
296
to serve on juries since the 1860s.
The New Mexico state courts use certified court interpreters, some
297
on permanent staff and others who work on a contract basis. All
interpreters are governed by detailed “Non-English-Speaking Juror
298
Guidelines.” All litigants and jurors are informed of the interpreters’
299
role in the trial and deliberation proceedings. The interpreters take an
oath in open court that they “will only provide translation services to the
non-English-speaking juror and will not otherwise participate in the trial
300
or jury deliberations.” During the LEP juror’s service, the interpreter
provides simultaneous and consecutive interpretation of the proceedings,
301
as well as written translation when necessary.
In addition to the language interpretation provided for LEP jurors in
New Mexico, federal and state courts provide sign language interpretation
302
for deaf jurors. Previously, deaf jurors were excluded from jury service

22 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 37, 41–43 (2001); see, e.g., Town of Trinidad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65, 68
(1879) (holding it was “fully within the power of the court to appoint an interpreter . . . to interpret the
testimony of witnesses and the arguments of counsel” for a non-English-speaking juror).
291. Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. Ct.
Innovation 303, 303 (2008).
292. Id. at 305.
293. See id. at 303–04; Territory of New Mexico v. Romine, 2 N.M. 114, 123 (1881).
294. Chávez, supra note 291, at 303.
295. N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3.
296. Gómez, supra note 290, at 1172–73.
297. Chávez, supra note 291, at 309.
298. Id. at 317 (providing a copy of the Guidelines in Appendix A).
299. Id. at 318.
300. Id. at 308.
301. Id. at 309.
302. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
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on the grounds that they lacked the English language and communication
303
304
skills necessary to serve. However the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
305
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 have been employed to
facilitate deaf persons’ full participation on juries with the assistance of
306
sign language interpreters throughout the nation’s courts. Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against
persons with hearing loss in “any program or activity receiving Federal
307
financial assistance.” Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act
extended the prohibition of discrimination against deaf individuals to all
governmental activities and made these services, programs and activities
308
available to all qualified individuals with disabilities. The requirement
that courts must provide interpreters for deaf jurors supports the
argument that LEP jurors similarly should be allowed to serve on jury
panels with the assistance of an interpreter. Scholars have argued that
the analogy between deaf and LEP jurors is not about accommodation of
disability, but rather that the two groups lack English language abilities
and can be made competent to serve as jurors with reasonable
309
accommodation in the form of interpretation.
There are four primary concerns about jurors serving with the
assistance of interpreters: (1) jurors not relying on the official English
record, (2) risk of inaccuracy in translation, (3) presence of a thirteenth
310
person in the jury room, and (4) cost. Examination of these concerns is
not only warranted, but also provides insights into the history,
consequences, and perpetuation of systemic subordination of linguistic
minorities. The first two concerns, accuracy and reliance on the English
record, overlap. The trepidation that a juror will not rely on the English
record that will ultimately be transmitted to the appellate court on
311
appeal was the central issue in Hernandez, in which the Supreme Court
held that a prosecutor may reject Latino English-Spanish bilingual jurors
in cases with Spanish language testimony on the ground that the jurors
might be guided by the original Spanish rather than the official English
312
translation. Before getting to the doctrinal application of the holding in
this case to juror language accommodation, it is appropriate to reflect on
the broader implication of this opinion on the denial of Latinos’

303. Jo Anne Simon, The Use of Interpreters for the Deaf and the Legal Community’s Obligation to
Comply with the A.D.A., 8 J.L. & Health 155, 157–58 (1994).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
305. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
306. Kibbee, supra note 290, at 91 n.35; Kisor, supra note 290, at 39.
307. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
308. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
309. See Kisor, supra note 290, at 38.
310. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 532.
311. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371–72 (1991) (plurality opinion).
312. See id.
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citizenship right of jury service. This was not a case in which the potential
jurors indicated that they would not follow English language translation
of Spanish evidence. The prosecutor acknowledged that the jurors
indicated a willingness to follow the interpreter, and that he believed “in
their heart they will try to follow” the interpreter, but stated that he
313
doubted their ability to do so due to their bilingual abilities.
The legal justification of the severance of language from race,
ethnicity, and national origin is that LEP citizens can become full citizens
and serve on juries if they simply learn English—that language is a
314
mutable characteristic. Leaving aside the issue of the considerable
difficulties of learning a foreign language sufficiently to serve on a jury,
Hernandez reveals that this is a false promise. Even once a citizen
becomes highly proficient or fluent in English, she can still be excluded
on the basis of her language ability. Although there have been instances
where racial minorities have been subjected to abuse and trauma that has
largely annihilated their language skills, such as Native American
315
boarding schools, generally a person cannot voluntarily unlearn their
mother tongue. One’s native language is an immutable characteristic that
is usually central to identity of self, race, ethnicity, and national origin.
Hernandez demonstrates the need to increase legal protection for
language minorities.
Although Hernandez dealt with bilingual rather than LEP jurors, the
plurality opinion has implications for juror language accommodation.
Peremptory challenges themselves have long been criticized as an obstacle
to ensuring juries that fairly represent the community. As Justice
Thurgood Marshall warned in his concurring opinion in Batson v.
Kentucky, the “decision today will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be
316
accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.” The
317
scholarship critiquing peremptory challenges is plentiful.
For the purposes of juror language requirements, in a case where
Spanish language evidence is introduced, a party (most likely a
prosecutor) might rely on Hernandez to strike a Spanish-speaking LEP

313. Id. at 356.
314. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1585, 1613 (1997).
315. See generally David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and
the Boarding School Experience, 1875–1928 (1995).
316. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986).
317. See, e.g., Brian W. Stoltz, Note, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers
Enforce the Principles of Batson, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2007); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A
Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1099 (1994); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809 (1997); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge
Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369 (1992).
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Latino juror on the ground that he will not follow the English language
evidence. The risk identified in Hernandez—that a juror would listen to
the original Spanish testimony or evidence over its English translation—is
significantly heightened where a juror has limited English proficiency. If
the juror does not understand English well to begin with, it is likely that
the juror would listen most closely to the original Spanish speaker (or
other foreign language speaker). Furthermore, assuming that the juror
does not understand English at all, she might have to rely solely on the
original non-English testimony.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s purported concern in Hernandez is in
reality not significant. Jurors do not make decisions as individuals; they
make them collectively. Therefore, if there were misinterpretation or
misunderstanding of a key issue, deliberation discussions could reveal
and remedy that. Furthermore, as discussed previously, the presence of
jurors from varied backgrounds and language abilities might actually
result in a more dynamic jury deliberation, particularly where one of the
318
parties to the trial is also LEP.
The concern here is essentially one of accuracy. What is interesting
is that Spanish language testimony and other evidence are increasingly
319
introduced at trial. This evidence is interpreted or translated into
English. There is little concern about the accuracy of these translations.
If Spanish can be translated into English and is reliable enough to form the
basis of someone’s criminal conviction and subsequent imprisonment,
translating English into Spanish should not be an insurmountable obstacle
for the courts. Furthermore, it is likely that many LEP Spanish-speaking
jurors will have some degree of bilingualism and will be able to ensure
that translation in both directions is more accurate. Thus, LEP jurors
might actually provide a useful safeguard during multilingual trials as a
result of their language ability. For example, during deliberation, LEP
jurors could verify the testimony and clarify Spanish idioms or
colloquialisms not easily or reliably translatable into English.
Nevertheless, the concern about accuracy is valid. Court
320
interpretation has challenges. However, the success in New Mexico
shows that providing interpreters for jurors (even in a wide range of
321
languages) is an attainable measure. Certainly, courts cannot move
forward without trained interpreters and developed guidelines. But, courts
318. Fukurai, supra note 60, at 11.
319. See Lopez & Livingston, supra note 122, at 6 (“56% of Latinos say they or someone in their
immediate family had interacted with the criminal justice system in at least one of the following ways
in the five years preceding this survey”—serving as a witness, reporting a crime to the police, charged
as a defendant, etc.); Deborah M. Weissman, Between Principles and Practice: The Need for Certified
Court Interpreters in North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1899, 1958 (2000).
320. Susan Berk-Seligson, The Bilingual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in the Judicial
Process 234 (William M. O’Barr & John. M. Conley eds., 1990).
321. Chávez, supra note 291, at 303.
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do not have to reinvent the wheel to establish a juror interpretation
system: New Mexico stands as a useful model for other jurisdictions.
Identifying and employing qualified interpreters is not without cost.
In these challenging economic times a juror interpretation system is a
significant investment of already scant resources. However, as the LEP
population in the United States continues to grow, the Department of
Justice has urged courts to increase language access for LEP
322
populations. Civil litigants and criminal defendants are already entitled
to interpretation services in the courts pursuant to the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, due process, and Title VI. Further, the Sixth
Amendment fair cross section requirement is implicated in communities
that have a significant language minority.
However, the pool of qualified and certified court interpreters, even
for a common language such as Spanish, is surprisingly small, adding to
the cost. This is a complex problem that has been caused by the
subordination of language minorities, especially Latinos. A large portion
of the land that constitutes “Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico,
Nevada, and parts of Utah, Colorado, and Kansas” was previously part
323
of Mexico. With the land came people, the majority of whom spoke
324
Spanish. In addition to these Chicanos who never crossed the border
325
(the border crossed them) and their families are Latino immigrants
who constitute the largest racial group of immigrants in the United
326
States. Rather than embracing the richness of Spanish language abilities
and promoting bilingualism, society has systematically attempted to force
assimilation and exterminate Spanish language ability. Truly bilingual
327
education programs have been replaced with English immersion. These
programs were not the result of pedagogical imperative, but rather
political actions motivated by English-only advocates, by a movement
328
tainted with racist and xenophobic leaning.
English immersion often stunts a student’s intellectual development
because, instead of learning a variety of academic subject areas, they
must focus only on English language acquisition and therefore fall
329
behind in grade level. Simultaneously, Latino youth are stripped of the

322. Dep’t of Justice, Language Access Plan (2012).
323. Delgado, supra note 142, at 8.
324. Salinas, supra note 33, at 96.
325. John M. Lipski, Varieties of Spanish in the United States 2 (2008).
326. See Randall Monger & James Yankay, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., Annual Flow Report: U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2011 at 1, 4, tbl.3 (2012).
327. Jennifer Bonilla Moreno, ¿Only English? How Bilingual Education Can Mitigate the Damage
of English-Only, 20 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 197, 198 (2012).
328. Salinas, supra note 33, at 917–18.
329. Paul R. Smokowski & Martica Bacallao, Becoming Bicultural: Risk, Resilience, and
Latino Youth 74 (2011).
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opportunity to become educated in Spanish. It is one thing to speak
Spanish at home and another to learn academically in Spanish. Someone
may consider herself fully bilingual but be unable to communicate
effectively when faced with work or educational demands in that
language. As a result of devaluing Spanish, forced language assimilation
that includes a lack of bilingual education and punishment for speaking
Spanish at school, we are left without sufficient numbers of bilingual
professionals to satisfy domestic linguistic needs and to be internationally
competitive. The claim that language discrimination cannot be remedied
because of the lack of qualified interpreters and the related cost of
obtaining such interpreters needs to be considered in the context that the
limited supply is a result of institutionalized, state-supported efforts to
decrease foreign, and especially Spanish, language ability.
The final concern is the presence of a “thirteenth” person in the
deliberation room. However, there is already substantial support for such
practice in our state and federal courts where sign language interpreters
are allowed to interpret for deaf jurors during deliberations. Additionally,
the presence of interpreters during deliberation has not been found to be
a problem in New Mexico. Research is currently being conducted by
Lysette Chavez and Markus Kemmelmeier of the University of NevadaReno Department of Social Psychology into New Mexico’s bilingual
juries, specifically on the effect of non-English speaking (“NES”) jurors
on jury deliberations and jury verdicts. These researchers have engaged
in archival study of cases to determine whether NES jurors have an effect
on verdicts in criminal cases, and have conducted community surveys and
mock jury studies. Although data analysis is ongoing, this research so far
reveals several findings that support juror language accommodation and
indicates the fairness of these trials.
In criminal cases, archival research and mock jury studies show that
there is no difference in verdicts between juries that have a LEP juror
serving with language accommodation and juries that have no LEP jurors.
The researchers conclude that “NES jurors and interpreters do NOT
331
compromise deliberation outcomes.” The Chavez and Kemmelmeier
research further indicates that the inclusion of NES jurors is actually
beneficial for the court system. “Participants in the sample who had prior
jury experience and served on a trial with an NES juror were likely to
view future jury service positively compared to participants who had
332
prior jury service but had NOT served on a trial with an NES juror.”
Further, “Anglo participants in the sample who had prior jury experience
with NES jurors were more supportive of the inclusion of NES jurors
330. Id. at 905–06.
331. E-mail from Lysette Chavez, Univ. of Nevada-Reno, to Author (May 27, 2012) (on file with
Author).
332. Id.
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than Anglo participants who had not served with NES Jurors.”
However, this “was not the case for Latino participants. Latinos who had
served with NES jurors did not differ in their support for the inclusion of
334
NES jurors.” Thus, the data show that juror language accommodation
actually positively impacted the New Mexico court system, providing a
greater sense of justice through more representative juries and
opportunities for democratic participation to a wider population.

Conclusion
As Latinos have become the largest racial minority group in the
United States, it is more important than ever to evaluate whether the law
is prepared to redress the discrimination experienced by this population.
Language discrimination has been and continues to be a central
manifestation of racism against Latinos. English language juror
requirements are just one example of the way language discrimination
relegates many Latinos to second class citizenship status. These
requirements are also an example of how the existing juridical paradigm
overlooks the realities of how language discrimination acts as a proxy or
racial marker for racial discrimination. The time has come to employ new
methodology, like Critical Originalism, to expose the discriminatory
intent behind language restrictions.
Excluding otherwise eligible jurors from service on the basis of their
English language abilities constitutes the exclusion of racial minorities,
particularly Latinos, from juries. Chief Judge Edward L. Chávez of the
New Mexico Supreme Court has observed the benefits of juror language
accommodation and advises: “Not only should our non-English-speaking
citizens enjoy the privileges of citizenship, they should share in the
335
responsibilities.” “All adult citizens should participate [on juries],
because above all, justice requires an unapologetic and undaunted
courage to exercise one’s moral genius. All people, no matter their
station in life or their ability to speak and understand the English
336
language have that moral genius.” Allowing jurors to serve with the
assistance of interpreters would help ensure that Latino criminal
defendants are tried by a jury of their peers, that LEP citizens are
brought into the civil polity, and that our justice system’s commitment to
equal protection under the law and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
an impartial jury are upheld.

333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
Id.
Chávez, supra note 291, at 316.
Id. at 304.

